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Dealing with U.S.-China Cultural Conflicts in FCPA
Enforcement: A Pluralistic Conflict-of-Laws Approach
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 251 (2022)

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes payments and gifts to
foreign government officials to gain an improper business advantage. While the FCPA arguably
provides the United States with a powerful tool to promote more ethical business investments
worldwide, its expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction has been the subject of continued criticism.
One major criticism is that the FCPA, by imposing U.S. values about gift giving on foreign
markets, constitutes a form of cultural and moral imperialism. To properly address this criticism,
the FCPA needs legal techniques and mechanisms to deal with cultural conflicts resulting from its
extraterritorial enforcement. This Article proposes a pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach to the
resolution of cultural conflicts in FCPA cases, with a special focus on the clash of cultural values
between China and the U.S. over gift giving. I will apply this approach to the analysis of a
hypothetical FCPA case in which the Chinese business culture, which is heavily influenced by
personalized social networks of power, allegedly collides with the standards of ethical conduct in
the United States. Following each analytical step, I demonstrate how the pluralistic conflict-oflaws approach turns otherwise irresolvable cultural conflicts into legally viable outcomes in
specific cases, and how it captures a crucial insight of modern cultural anthropology—that culture
is dynamic, internally contested, and contextual—in this process.
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INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)1 makes it a federal crime to offer
money or anything of value to foreign government officials, political parties, and
other prohibited recipients to obtain or retain business.2 The FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions establish jurisdiction over domestic entities (U.S. corporations and
nationals), foreign issuers (foreign corporations with shares trading on a U.S. stock
exchange), and any person other than an issuer or domestic concern who takes steps
in furtherance of an improper payment scheme while in U.S. territory.3 Over the
last three decades, there has been a substantial increase in FCPA enforcement as the
U.S. government continues to expand the FCPA's extraterritorial reach.4 The FCPA,
as currently enforced, allows U.S. prosecution of almost entirely foreign bribery
conduct so long as the conduct has some—if even tangential—contact with the
United States.5
Primarily because of its expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction, the FCPA has
long been subject to critiques of cultural and moral imperialism.6 Specifically, it has
been accused of unilaterally and forcibly imposing U.S. values about gift giving on
foreign markets. 7 To address this concern, scholars have proposed either the
rejection of the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction or the unification of worldwide
anti-bribery laws. 8 This Article argues that both these proposals fail to solve
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd–1, 78dd–2, 78ff (1988) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-213,91
Stat. 1494 (1977), and amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25).

1

2

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1 to –3.

3

Id.

Mateo J. de la Torre, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Imposing an American Definition of
Corruption on Global Markets, 49 Cornell Int’l L.J. 469, 470–72 (2016).

4

Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA under International Law, 51
Willamette L. Rev. 225, 226–28 (2015) (“The use of the U.S. mail can be sufficient to invoke
jurisdiction so long as the mailing formed an incidental component of the underlying violation.”).

5

See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229 (1997) [hereinafter Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market]; Steven R.
Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24
Yale J. Int’l L. 223 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Global Village]; Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 419 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, A Threat
to Global Harmony]; Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 Minn.
J. Int’l L. 155 (2009).

6

7

See sources cited supra note 6.

Salbu, Global Village, supra note 6 (arguing that the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction is
crude and unwieldy and therefore should be limited); Andrew B. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:

8
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problems of cultural conflicts in the FCPA enforcement. The proposals either ignore
the legitimate interest of the United States in disciplining its own companies’ roles
in overseas markets or hold an unrealistic vision of the prospect of global legal
unification. Moreover, existing exceptions9 and affirmative defenses10 prescribed
under the FCPA are also ill-equipped to accommodate cultural differences. The
“local written law defense,” for example, exempts only those payments and gifts that
are “lawful under the written laws and regulations” of the host country.11 As a result,
this defense fails to accommodate those unofficial cultural norms that, although not
explicitly stipulated in law, are otherwise socially acceptable and not officially
outlawed in the host country. The “facilitating or expediting payments” exception,12
by carving out an exception for certain corrupt behaviors believed to be prevalent
elsewhere, reinforces the cultural stereotype that emerging markets are associated
with corruption and unsound governance. Overall, the question of how cultural
conflicts can be properly resolved in the FCPA enforcement has not yet received a
satisfactory answer from either the academic or legislative field.
This Article proposes a pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach to the resolution of
cultural conflicts in FCPA cases.13 Conflict of laws, traditionally viewed as a branch
of law aiming to solve multistate legal disputes between private persons or entities,
consists of three subdivisions: jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment
recognition. 14 Conflicts is a field of private law that deals with cases involving
foreign fact elements that give rise to reasonable doubt as to the application of law.15
Under the conflicts analysis, jurisdiction and choice of law are two independent
inquiries.16 The conflicts analysis decides not only which state provides the forum
to adjudicate the dispute, but also whether the dispute is to be resolved in
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 Fla. L. Rev.
351, 351–58 (2010) (promoting global legal unification on combating bribery of foreign government
officials).
9

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(b).

10

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(c).

11

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(c)(1).

12

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(b).

The implication of conflict-of-laws methodologies for cultural debates was first explored by
Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles. See Karen Knop et al., From Multiculturalism to
Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (2012).

13

14

Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 1 (Stephen M. Shepard ed., 2016).

Gerhart Husserl, The Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws. Part II: Defining and Characterizing
the Fact Element in Conflict Cases, 26 Va. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1940).

15

16

Symeonides, supra note 14.
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accordance with the substantive law of the forum or that of the foreign state(s).17
Therefore, a U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction but nevertheless decide to apply
Chinese law, if the choice-of-law analysis reaches the conclusion that Chinese law
should be the governing law of the dispute. As a discipline dealing with foreignrelated legal disputes, conflict of laws offers a series of doctrines and technical steps
to determine whether foreign or forum law should be applied to a specific case. This
Article aims to show how the highly technical field of conflict of laws, when
imagined and applied as an intellectual framework, offers new approaches to
understanding, evaluating, and ultimately resolving cultural conflicts in FCPA
cases.
Although standard conflict of laws does not require engaging in cultural
analysis, its partnership with cultural anthropology is by no means arbitrary. Both
disciplines deal with the dichotomy of self and other: a permanent interplay
between the “similarity and difference, the familiar and the strange, the here and
the elsewhere.”18 As Annelise Riles has argued:
A partnership between anthropology and conflicts makes sense because both fields
share a common foundational premise: what looks exotic or irrational in one context or
from one point of view looks perfectly rational and even admirable from another, and to
the extent possible, one should seek to understand other people’s ways of knowing the
world, on their own terms, before passing judgment on them according to one’s own
moral or legal criteria.19

Recently, a growing number of conflicts scholars have explored the potential of
conflict of laws as a methodology to approach problems involving the allocation of
regulatory powers in the international arena. 20 Among these scholars, Annelise
Riles, both separately and jointly with Ralf Michaels and Karen Knop, proposed
conflict of laws as a new approach to the problems of multiculturalism—e.g., the
conflict between commitments to human rights and respect for cultural

17

Id.

James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography,
Literature, and Art 146 (1988).

18

19

Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 273, 275 (2008).

For literature exploring the implication of conflict of laws for global governance at various
levels, see, e.g., Jacco Bomhoff, The Constitution of the Conflict of Laws, in Private International
Law and Global Governance 262 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego Fernandez Arroyo eds., 2014);
Christian Joerges et al., Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Post-National Constellation: Special
Issue of Transnational Legal Theory, 2 Transnat’l Leg. Theory 153 (2011); Christian Joerges, The
Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 Duke J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 149 (2004).

20
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differences.21 Their proposal takes on the “self-conscious” technicalities of conflicts
methodologies, which refers to an instrumentalist view of conflict of laws as
consisting of “a set of doctrines and methods for resolving real disputes.”22 In their
joint work, they took as their starting point what at first glance seemed to be a usual
conflicts case that did not involve culture debates—“a hypothetical case based on an
actual dispute litigated in California between a Japanese father and daughter over a
transfer of shares.” 23 However, on a closer analysis, they found that this case
revealed dimensions of cultural conflicts: the kinship relationship represented by a
Japanese “lineage company” collided with modern corporate practices. 24
Proceeding through the technical steps of a slightly modified conflicts analysis,
Riles, Michaels and Knop demonstrated how conflicts doctrines opened up an
avenue to turn an otherwise irresolvable cultural conflict into a narrowly tailored
and technically specific choice-of-law problem.25
This Article continues their efforts to further explore the implications of
conflicts methodologies for cultural debates, with a special focus on the conflict
between U.S. and Chinese gift-giving culture in FCPA cases. While the doctrines
and theories of conflicts analysis have traditionally been constructed for coping with
collisions of official state-made laws, 26 this Article adopts a slightly modified
approach of conflicts analysis—a pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach. This
approach is pluralistic in the sense that it draws on anthropological theories of legal
pluralism, which generally argue that law is not the exclusive artifact of the nationstate but is rather produced by various communities that structure and regulate the
behavior of their members.27 For the purpose of this Article, a conflicts analysis that
is informed by legal pluralism requires that we depart from a traditional approach
to conflict of laws which only deals with state-made law, assuming that conflicts
analysis could be applied to those unofficial cultural norms that govern significant

See Knop et al., supra note 13; Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking
on the Technicalities, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 973 (2005) [hereinafter Riles, A New Agenda]; Annelise Riles,
Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, 108 Am. Anthropol. 52
(2006) [hereinafter Riles, The Iron Cage]; Riles, supra note 19.

21

22

Riles, A New Agenda, supra note 21, at 977.

23

Knop et al., supra note 13, at 593–94, 613.

24

Id. at 594, 613.

25

Id. at 646, 649.

Gunther Teubner & Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Transnational Regimes
in the Double Fragmentation of World Society, in Regime Interaction in International Law:
Facing Fragmentation 23, 24 (Margret Young ed., 2010).

26

27

Riles, supra note 19, at 294.

256

DEALING WITH U.S.-CHINA CULTURAL
CONFLICTS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT

aspects of our lives. That is, a pluralist conflict-of-laws approach will recognize not
only the conflicts between the respective written laws and stipulations of China and
the United States, but also the conflicts between the unwritten cultural norms of
both countries.
I will demonstrate the contribution of the pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach
through the analysis of a hypothetical FCPA case. In this case, Avon Products Inc.
(“Avon”) and its wholly owned subsidiary Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd. (“Avon
China”) have been charged with bribing Chinese government officials with gifts,
non-business meals, and entertainment to retain business opportunities
(hereinafter “the Avon case”). 28 In court, Avon and Avon China raise a cultural
defense, arguing that certain gift-giving practices aligned with Chinese customs
and were not in violation of China’s written laws and regulations. By doing so, they
establish a cultural conflict between different value systems as to the practice of gift
giving. The facts and legal issues in this case are extracted and generalized from
actual FCPA prosecutions.29 However, it is hypothetical in the sense that the facts
have been reorganized and presented in a logical way to allow a more nuanced and
sophisticated analysis of cultural conflicts. Following each analytical step, one will
see how this approach allows cultural conflicts to be articulated in legally defensible
terms in FCPA cases. In addition, the analysis performed under this approach
captures a crucial insight of modern cultural anthropology—that culture is
dynamic, internally contested, and contextual.30
I.

DEALING WITH CULTURAL CONFLICTS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT: WHY
EXISTING APPROACHES FAIL

The FCPA’s ever-expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction has been accompanied
by a growing number of criticisms. One of the major criticisms draws directly from
anthropological theories of cultural relativism, critiquing the FCPA as a form of
This hypothetical case is based on a real FCPA prosecution against Avon and its Chinese
subsidiary in 2014. For information on the real Avon case, see Complaint, Securities and
Exchange Comm’n v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 14-CV-9956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014); Patricia
Hurtado, Avon Unit Gave Gucci Bags, Trips as China Bribes: U.S., Bloomberg Business (Dec. 17,
2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-17/avon-ends-bribery-probe-tied-tochina-with-unit-guilty-plea-1- [perma.cc/E6KQ-TEYV].

28

For discussions about bribery in real FCPA cases, see Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial
Application of the FCPA under International Law, 51 Willamette L. Rev. 225, 241–49 (2015).

29

Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs 309, 338 (Summer
2008) (“. . . opinion has increasingly converged on an understanding of culture as dynamic rather
than static, internally contested rather than monolithic, and contextual rather than simply
rules.”).

30
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moral imperialism.31 Scholars who levy such critiques generally argue that bribery
is largely a cultural construct and that the United States, by imposing an American
definition of bribery on global markets, is unjustifiably infringing on the
sovereignty of other nations. 32 While these scholars generally recognize the
legitimacy of value variance regarding bribery and gift giving,33 they nonetheless fail
to propose meaningful solutions to the resulting conflicts. Proposed solutions that
ignore conflicts-of-laws analysis tend to bind questions of jurisdiction with those of
applicable law, assuming that a court’s assertion of jurisdiction to adjudicate a
cross-border bribery case inevitably leads to the application of the forum state’s own
norms on the dispute.34 In this vein, the traditional approach presumes that cultural
conflicts resulting from the extraterritorial application of the FCPA could be avoided
either by rejecting the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction or by promoting a
worldwide anti-bribery legal unification.35 This section explains the failure of these
solutions to generate satisfactory results for the complex cultural issues that the
FCPA presents.
A. Rejecting the FCPA’s Extraterritorial Reach
Steven Salbu’s arguments provide a prominent example of the proposition that
the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction should be rejected to avoid the moral
imperialism critiques.36 According to Salbu,
Today’s world remains diverse and heterogeneous, populated by groups that often have
highly individualized cultural identities . . . . Whatever mechanisms one state may put
into its laws to avoid inflicting its values on other states, moral imperialism is an
ineluctable reality whenever one sovereign entity seeks to alter or control behavior
inside the borders of another . . . . The invasiveness of externally interpreting and
assessing host country behaviors can be tempered only by the eventual, and perhaps
even imminent, homogenization of cultures worldwide. Until and unless that day
arrives, however, efforts to curb corruption by an externally imposed global mandate
are not defensible.37

There are two aspects to Salbu’s argument. First, he argues that the FCPA

See, e.g., de la Torre, supra note 4; Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market, supra note 6; Salbu, Global
Village, supra note 6; Salbu, A Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 6.

31

32

See sources cited supra note 31.

33

See, e.g., Salbu, Global Village, supra note 6, at 232–40.

34

See, e.g., Salbu, Global Village, supra note 6, at 252; Spalding, supra note 8, at 351–58.

35

See sources cited supra note 8.

36

Salbu, Global Village, supra note 6, at 252.

37

Id.
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constitutes an encroachment on the host countries’ abilities to regulate activities
exclusively within their own borders. 38 This argument ignores the legitimate
interest of the United States in disciplining its own multinational corporations
(“MNCs”) in overseas markets. In fact, as Elizabeth Spahn has argued, given the
devastating impacts of corruption on global economy, it is ethically appropriate,
and perhaps even required, for the United States to regulate its own MNCs’ overseas
behavior in the corrupt interactions of bribe givers and bribe takers.39 Moreover,
Salbu’s argument ignores the legitimate interest of the United States in protecting
its own consumers in global transactions.40 For example, the effects of the so-called
culture of corruption between bribe givers of the U.S.-based MNCs and their
Chinese bribe-taking counterparts are not limited to China.41 Scholars have shown
that corruption can result in significant dangers to public health and safety, and that
as a link in the global supply chain, American consumers are not immune from such
dangers. 42 International law also recognizes the FCPA’s jurisdiction over the
conduct of U.S. nationals abroad, and over conduct that takes place overseas but
injures the interest of U.S. nationals.43 International law recognizes five traditional
grounds for a sovereign to assert jurisdictions, which include “nationality”
jurisdiction over the conduct of the sovereign’s own nationals and “protective”
jurisdiction over conduct that may injure the sovereign’s national interests. 44
Therefore, the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over bribery from U.S.-based

38

Id.

39

Spahn, supra note 6, at 224.

40

Id. at 210.

41

Id.

Id. at 211 (“Toxic toothpaste, contaminated milk, lead paint on easily swallowed small parts
in children’s toys, fake pharmaceuticals, and poisonous pet foods are just some of this year’s costs
of the culture of corruption between the elite bribe givers of the U.S. corporations and their elite
bribe taking counterparts in China.”); Upton Au, Toward a Reconceived Legislative Intent behind the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Public Safety Rational for Prohibiting Bribery Abroad, 79 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 925, 950 (2014).

42

United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899–900 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[T]here are five traditional
bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes under international law[, including]: Territorial,
wherein jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed; National, wherein
jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the offender; protective, wherein jurisdiction is based
on whether the national interest is injured; Universal, wherein jurisdiction is conferred in any
forum that obtains physical custody of the perpetuator of certain offenses considered particularly
heinous and harmful to humanity[; and] passive personal, wherein jurisdiction is based on the
nationality of the victim.”).

43

44

Id.
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MNCs to Chinese government officials does not violate principles of international
law.
In the first aspect of his argument, Salbu emphasizes the plurality of local values
around the world as a basis to reject the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.45 This
logic assumes that if a court asserts jurisdiction with regard to a particular crossborder dispute, it necessarily applies the forum law to that dispute. What Salbu
ignores is that the discipline of conflict of laws offers another possibility. As will be
discussed later, conflict of laws separates the question of which court has the
authority to hear the case (jurisdiction) from the question of which normative
community supplies the applicable law to govern the case (choice of law).46 Even
though a U.S. court claims jurisdiction over a specific case, conflict of laws
envisages the possibility that the U.S. court will defer to Chinese law and culture to
decide the liabilities of the parties. In fact, this possibility is not new to the FCPA.
The FCPA explicitly prescribes that it shall be an affirmative defense if the payments
and gifts are lawful under the written laws of the host country.47 Defenders of the
FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction have constantly referred to this affirmative
defense to argue that the FCPA respects and accommodates cultural diversity. 48
Spahn has even commented that, by prescribing this affirmative defense, the
United States actually places the power to regulate its own corporations’ overseas
bribery “solely in the hands of the bribe-receiving sovereign.”49
Salbu does not believe that this affirmative defense addresses his concerns and,
as a response to those defenders, he raises two rebuttals. 50 Salbu’s first rebuttal
points out that the affirmative defense only permits payments and gifts that are
lawful under the written laws of the host country, which ignores the fact that the
cultural divergence between the United States and the host country in regard to gift
giving “is very unlikely to be manifested in written laws.”51 He argues, therefore,
that such ignorance of the possible inconsistencies between law on the books and
law in action will significantly limit the ability of this affirmative defense to
accommodate cultural differences.52

45

Salbu, Global Village, supra note 6, at 232–40.

46

Knop et al., supra note 13, at 633.

47

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(c).

48

Salbu, A Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 6, at 424.

49

Spahn, supra note 6, at 174.

50

Salbu, A Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 6, at 423–25.

51

Id. at 425.

52

Id.
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Salbu’s second rebuttal argues that the affirmative defense will not reduce the
concerns of moral imperialism even if it is expanded to include laws in action.53 The
reason, according to Salbu, is that understanding foreign laws is a daunting task
fraught with formidable challenges of linguistic and cultural translation. 54 The
process of understanding foreign laws, Salbu argues, is unavoidably tainted with
the potential for bias and inaccuracy, the result of which is often a great likelihood
of imposing U.S. values on the interpretation of another normative regime.55 This
rebuttal also anticipates the second aspect of Salbu’s argument, which emphasizes
the cultural situatedness of one’s claims about foreign cultures.
In the second aspect of his argument, Salbu insists that the interpretation of
foreign laws can never be a truly unbiased process because U.S. prosecutors and
judges are always situated in their own value system when making claims about
foreign cultures.56 In this respect, however, Salbu perhaps would gain insight from
the discipline expressly devoted to dealing with foreign laws: conflict of laws. The
first step of the conflicts analysis is to see whether the case involves a foreign
element and, if so, to prove the content of the foreign law.57 As will be discussed
later, conflicts scholars are familiar with all the difficulties in the proof of foreign
law and they devise a series of techniques to overcome these difficulties. 58 One
crucial insight from the conflicts analysis is that conflicts lawyers are fully aware of
their situatedness and the impossibility of “finding” foreign laws—there is no
singular concept called “Chinese gift-giving culture” or “Chinese law.” Conflicts
lawyers are therefore experienced in dealing with a self-conscious impossibility: to
make claims about foreign law, while recognizing at the same time that the law’s
content is highly indeterminable and contestable.59 Riles, Michaels and Knop refer
to this type of reasoning as the “as if” modality of conflicts analysis. 60 Conflicts
analysis, they argue, operates with fictions—the analysis acknowledges the
indeterminable nature of foreign laws, but operates, for the time being, “as if” the
content of the foreign law could be proved for the specific case at hand.61 This “as if”
53

Id.

54

Id. at 426.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Husserl, supra note 15, at 453.

William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 23, 32–39
(1957).

58

59

Knop et al., supra note 13, at 644–45.

60

Id. at 645–47.

61

Id.
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modality responds to an important anthropological insight that cultural relativism
does not preclude moral judgments. 62 Rather, cultural relativism seeks to
understand another culture in its fully native setting, while at the same time
recognizing one’s own cultural situatedness before any judgment is attempted.63
B. Promoting a Worldwide Anti-Bribery Legal Unification
Andrew Spalding’s arguments provide a good example of the proposition that
the ethical risks inherent in the FCPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction can be addressed
by unifying international anti-bribery legislation.64 Spalding suggests expanding
the signatories to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention). 65 By signing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, capital-rich
countries that have not previously ratified anti-bribery conventions, such as China
and India, are subject to the same obligation to criminalize bribery of foreign
officials. 66 Spalding proposes the virtual equivalent of a progressive unification
agenda of international anti-bribery legislation. The logic behind this proposal is
that once other countries adopt similar anti-bribery laws, the FCPA-style legislation
can avert charges of exporting morality.
The first problem with this proposal, which Spalding himself admits, is that
global legal heterogeneity remains a compelling reality and, therefore, worldwide
unification of anti-bribery laws is not going to happen anytime soon.67 As a result,
Spalding’s proposal fails to provide meaningful guidance to the enforcement of the
FCPA in terms of the status quo of global legal heterogeneity. A more fundamental
problem with his proposal, however, is that the dream of global legal unification will
probably never come true. Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner have
strongly argued that any aspirations to a unification of global law are doomed from
the outset.68 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner contend that the fragmentation of global
law originates in the more fundamental fragmentation of global society itself, which
Terence Turner, Human Rights, Human Difference: Anthropology’s Contribution to an Emancipatory
Cultural Politics, 53 J. Anthropological Res. 273, 275 (1997).
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can never be completely erased. 69 Paul Schiff Berman even took the 1980
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as an example
to argue that all legal harmonization regimes are themselves the products of
pluralism and thus could never completely eliminate pluralism.70 Even though the
laws of each state may be uniform at the surface level, Berman argues, pluralism
inevitably creeps in as different states might interpret and apply the same laws
differently in their judicial practices.71
China provides a good example to illustrate Berman’s argument. In fact,
although China has not ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, it joined the
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)72 in 2003 and thereafter
amended the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC Criminal
Law”) to prohibit bribery of foreign government officials. 73 Even so, Chinese
methods of interpretation and implementation of anti-bribery provisions still
overwhelmingly reflect its own cultural, historical, and political traditions, which
are profoundly different from those of the United States.74 Therefore, China could
definitely join the United States in prohibiting the bribery of foreign government
officials, insisting all the while that it has different moral values regarding what
qualifies bribery. In other words, the discrepancies between Chinese and U.S.
normative regimes regarding bribery cannot simply be eliminated through the
imposition of universal codes of conduct. Instead, one must recognize pluralism as
a reality that will never disappear and seek a realistic legal approach to resolving the
conflicts between colliding normative regimes.
II.

BRIBERY OR GIFTS? A HYPOTHETICAL CASE

In the previous section, I argued that the elimination of cultural conflicts, either
by denying the legitimate interest of the United States in regulating its own MNCs
in overseas markets, or by imposing universal norms upon global markets, is simply

69
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impossible. Before introducing the pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach to cultural
conflicts, this present section first presents a hypothetical FCPA case. By examining
this case, readers will develop a more concrete idea of the kinds of cultural conflicts
that arise in FCPA cases.
A. The Avon Case75
In 2018, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)76 prosecuted Avon and its Chinese
subsidiary Avon China for bribing Chinese government officials in order to obtain
business benefits. Avon, incorporated and headquartered in New York City, is one
of the world’s largest direct-sell companies, dealing in beauty products. 77 Avon
issues and maintains a class of publicly traded securities registered pursuant to
Section 12 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78l) and is required
to file periodic reports with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under
Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §78m). 78 Avon China,
established and operated in Guangzhou, China, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Avon. Avon China’s books, records, and accounts are consolidated into Avon’s
books and reports and reported by Avon in its financial statements.
The DOJ’s general allegations may be summarized as follows. Avon entered the
Chinese market and established Avon China around 1990.79 The DOJ’s investigation
revealed that from at least 2004 to 2008, Avon China insured its receipt of the first
direct-selling license in the Chinese market with a total of $8 million in cash, gifts,
non-business meals, travel and entertainment to Chinese government officials and
state media reporters.80 The specific incriminating evidence included:

In 2014, Avon settled charges by the DOJ and SEC for violating the FCPA. See Philip Wahba,
Avon settles Justice Department charges of China bribery for $135 million, Fortune (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/12/17/avon-bribery-probe-settlement/ [perma.cc/A74S-HBEG].
References in this Article to the facts and the legal issues of that case are hypothetical and are for
academic research only.
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Enforcement of the FCPA is carried out by two agencies: the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (updated July 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download
[perma.cc/DKP8-GXLR].
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1.

Gifts to government officials: Avon China established and maintained a
Corporate Affairs Group whose responsibilities included “maintaining
guanxi81 with [Chinese] government officials and lobbying those officials
Avon China’s behalf.”82 In their employment agreements, employees of
the Corporate Affairs Groups agreed to bring Avon China to the attention
of relevant Chinese governmental departments and to develop guanxi to
successfully conduct business. 83 These governmental departments
include the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State Administration
for Industry and Commerce (AIC), and other governmental agencies
responsible for the regulation of direct-selling licenses.84 The Corporate
Affairs Group, and other Avon China executives and employees, routinely
gave gifts such as Avon products, vintage wines, mooncakes, and
personal luxury items to Chinese government officials.85
2. Meals and entertainment: Avon China created and maintained a “Direct
Selling Special Task Force” (the “Task Force”), which was comprised
primarily of employees from the Corporate Affairs Group. The aim of the
Task Force was to obtain direct selling approvals through the
establishment and maintenance of guanxi. From 2004 through 2008,
employees of the Task Force routinely spent money on meals,
entertainment, and lodging for Chinese government officials in order to
secure selling licenses for products that did not meet government
standards.86
3. Non-business travel expenses: In 2005, Corporate Affairs Group
employees took five officials from the Guangdong Food and Drug
Administration to the headquarters of Avon in New York City and its
research facility in upstate New York. During this alleged “factory
inspection,” Corporate Affairs Group employees also paid for hotels,
meals, airfare, entertainment, and sightseeing trips in major U.S. cities,
including visits to Hawaii, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles.87
Guanxi can be roughly translated as “personal connection, relationship, or network” and plays
a central role in Chinese society. For more detailed discussions about guanxi, see infra Section
II.C.2.
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4. Cash to government officials: In 2006, a Corporate Affairs Group
employee paid RMB10,000 (approximately $ 1538) to a Chinese
government official’s bank account to avoid a fine for violating Chinese
administrative regulations. Since 2006, there have been a total of
RMB1,000,000 (approximately $153,846) disbursed to government
officials as gifts for their personal events—wedding ceremonies,
funerals, college-entrance celebrations for their children, etc.88
5. Cash to suppress negative media reports: In 2006, a leading governmentowned Chinese newspaper intended to publish an article exposing Avon
China’s improper competitive tactics which might constitute a violation
of the Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China.
To avoid this negative media report, the Corporate Affairs Group paid
approximately RMB20,000 (approximately $3076) to a newspaper editor
in order to induce him to withdraw the manuscript. Thereafter, the
Corporate Affairs Group set up a Special Working Group focusing
especially on the maintenance of guanxi with key media’s employees.89
Avon responded as follows. Before entering the Chinese market, Avon was
advised to take seriously of the role of guanxi in Chinese culture, which had been
urged as a key (sometimes the key) to success in the Chinese marketplace.90 In fact,
Avon held three rounds of internal trainings on Chinese culture before it launched
its Chinese operations. During these internal trainings, executives of Avon China
were informed that China is a society composed of individuals closely connected by
existing societal relationships, or webs of guanxi.91 They were further taught that
the existence of guanxi often denotes informal relationships based implicitly on
reciprocal obligations and indebtedness, and that once guanxi is established
between parties to a transaction, each might ask for a favor of the other expecting
that the debt incurred will be repaid in the future. 92 The result of these internal
trainings on the Chinese culture of guanxi was a determination among the senior
executives of Avon to create a government relations department—the Corporate
Affairs Group. 93 This Corporate Affairs Group existed solely in Avon’s Chinese
subsidiary and was composed primarily of local Chinese employees. The
88
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responsibility of the Corporate Affairs Group, therefore, was to build guanxi with
Avon’s business partners in China, and with officials whose approvals and
assistance were crucial to Avon’s success in China.94
In addition, Avon China was advised that gift giving serves as the most common
method of cultivating guanxi in China. 95 Avon China insisted (although the DOJ
disagreed) that the gifts and payments offered by the Corporate Affairs Group were
not for any immediate rent-seeking return, but to cultivate continuous, longerterm relationships with influential Chinese government officials to avoid unfair
treatment due to a lack of personal acquaintance. In fact, in the early 2000s, China’s
legal framework was full of defects and uncertainties, and it was common for local
Chinese corporations to manipulate guanxi to conduct unfair competitions. 96
Therefore, it was Avon China’s business judgment that it should adapt itself to local
cultural practices (the cultivation of guanxi) in order to avoid unfair business results.
Avon China insisted that most of the gifts and payments it offered conform to
Chinese gift-giving culture and were not expressly prohibited by the written laws of
China. While Avon China did admit that the RMB10,000 cash gift to a Chinese
government official for the purpose of avoiding a fine constituted a bribe, it
nonetheless argued that the threshold for prosecuting entities for offering bribes
under Chinese law is RMB100,000 (approximately $15,384) when the bribes are
offered for the purpose of gaining unlawful benefits or to administrative
enforcement officers.97 Moreover, Avon China argued that it did not receive any
illegal gain from that payment because that payment was a product of extortion and
the recipient government official, not satisfied with the amount offered, finally
imposed the fine on Avon China anyway. Under the PRC Criminal Law, the bribe
payor is relieved of criminal liability if the bribe was extorted and the bribe payor
did not receive any illegitimate benefits.98 Therefore, Avon China argued that the
RMB10,000 cash payment it offered to the Chinese government official should be
94
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See infra Section II.C.2.
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excused in accordance with relevant provisions prescribed in Chinese law.
Regarding the cash gifts to a newspaper editor to suppress negative media
reports, Avon China argued that the recipient editor should not be considered a
foreign official. To the best of Avon China’s knowledge, the recipient editor was
only a temporary employee working at the state-owned newspaper. In fact, before
the payment was issued, Avon China even required that the recipient editor provide
his temporary employment contract to confirm that he did not qualify as a
government official.
B. The FCPA Is Ill-Equipped to Accommodate Cultural Differences
1.

The FCPA exceptions and affirmative defenses

Avon and Avon China’s cultural arguments are not likely to win the court’s
approval under existing FCPA provisions. The FCPA prohibits the payment of
money or anything of value to foreign government officials with corrupt intent for
the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. 99 The FCPA applies to American
companies and their employees regardless of whether they violate the FCPA
domestically or abroad.100 The FCPA may also apply to foreign nationals who act
outside the United States, so long as they act on behalf of an American company as
an officer, director, or employee. 101 In fact, the FCPA’s jurisdiction covers every
possible combination of nationality, physical location, agency relation, place of
registration, and principal place of business, excluding only nonresident foreign
nationals acting outside the United States without any agency, employment, or
shareholder relationship with a U.S corporation.102 Therefore, Avon’s contention
that the Corporate Affairs Group existed solely in its Chinese subsidiary and was
composed primarily of local Chinese employees would not affect the application of
the FCPA. Moreover, while the FCPA does require corrupt intent, it only requires
the intent to wrongfully influence a foreign official to misuse his official position.103
It does not, however, differentiate whether the gifts and payments are made for an
immediate return or in the expectation of unspecified favors in the future.
Therefore, Avon China’s contention that the gifts were used as a common method
of cultivating guanxi, an informal relationship based implicitly on indebtedness and
reciprocal obligations in the future, could not prove its absence of corrupt intent
99
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under the FCPA.
One possible strategy for Avon is to avail itself of the “facilitating or expediting
payments” 104 exception under the FCPA. The FCPA establishes an exception to
bribery liability for “any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine
governmental action by a foreign official.” 105 “Routine governmental action” is
defined as an action ordinarily performed by a foreign official which include, among
others, issuing permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to
do business in a foreign country. 106 Since the events incriminating Avon
surrounded its receipt of the direct-selling license in China, it might argue that the
purpose of the gifts and payments was to secure the issuance of business licenses,
which should be considered a performance of “routine governmental action.” The
court, however, is not likely to approve this argument; the FCPA exceptions have
been narrowly construed to apply only to payments made for nondiscretionary,
ministerial activities performed by mid- or low-level government officials.107 The
FCPA even explicitly excludes actions “involving whether to award new business or
continue business” from the narrow categories of “routine governmental action.”108
Whether to award Avon the first direct-selling license in China obviously constitutes
a discretionary decision and therefore does not fall under the “routine governmental
action” exception.
Another possible strategy for Avon is to avail itself of the two affirmative
defenses prescribed under the FCPA: the “local written law defense” 109 and the
“reasonable and bona fide business expense defense.”110 For the “local written law
defense” to apply, Avon must establish that the payment and gifts were lawful in
accordance with the written laws and regulations of China.111 Congress has made it
clear, however, that “the absence of written laws in a foreign official’s country would
not by itself be sufficient to satisfy this defense.” 112 Rather, the acts must be
expressly permitted via statutes or regulations of the foreign country in order to
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avert bribery charges under the FCPA.113 Therefore, Avon China’s contention that
most of the gifts and payments it offered conform to Chinese gift-giving culture and
are not expressly prohibited by the written laws of China would not satisfy this
defense. Furthermore, in United States v. Kozeny, the court held that even if a
defendant “is relieved of criminal responsibility for his actions by a provision of the
foreign law,” he may still “be prosecuted under the FCPA” for payments that violate
foreign law.114 In other words, there is no immunity from FCPA prosecution if the
relevant foreign law merely provides for exceptions to a general prohibition on
bribery payments. Therefore, even though Avon could establish that it should be
relieved of criminal liability under Chinese law because either the amount of
payments fell below the threshold for criminal prosecution or the payments were a
product of extortion, the court will probably still find that it could not satisfy the
“local written law defense.”
The “reasonable and bona fide business expense defense” seems to have greater
relevance to gifts and business courtesies. The FCPA states that it shall be an
affirmative defense if the payment
was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses,
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official . . . and was directly related to (A) the
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution
of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.115

For this affirmative defense to apply, Avon could argue that the Chinese
officials’ travel to the United States, together with the lodging and entertainment
expenses incurred during these trips, were directly related to its application for
direct-selling licenses in China. For example, Avon could argue that it intended to
provide training to Chinese government officials in its U.S. facilities to enable them
to efficiently execute their duties relating to the evaluation of direct-selling
qualification. Avon could also argue that most of the gifts, such as mooncakes, skincare products, vintage wines, carried Avon’s name or logo and should come within
this affirmative defense as the “promotion of products or services.”116 The court,
however, will probably not approve these arguments because this affirmative
defense generally requires that the expenses be modest, and the value of the gifts be

113
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nominal.117 Moreover, the gifts should generally reflect the company’s business.118
In view of these requirements, Avon and Avon China would have a hard time
justifying those gifts irrelevant to their beauty business, such as mooncakes, vintage
wines, and travels to Hawaii, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles. Even though they could
justify the purpose of these expenses, they probably would still have a hard time
proving that these payments and expenses were modest and nominal in accordance
with the FCPA standards.
By any analysis, Avon is unlikely to avert the bribery charges via the existing
exception and affirmative defenses under the FCPA. Cultural arguments and
evidence of cultural practice play little if no role in existing FCPA cases. The FCPA
is simply ill-equipped to accommodate cultural differences—the single affirmative
defense that relates directly to foreign value systems only exempts practices that are
explicitly authorized by a written foreign law.119 As a result, the court might simply
reject Avon’s cultural evidence, such as guanxi and its operation in Chinese society,
on grounds of irrelevance.
2. Existing FCPA provisions reinforce cultural stereotypes
Although Avon’s cultural arguments are unlikely to prevail in court under the
existing FCPA provisions, the legislative history of the statute’s exception and
affirmative defenses clearly demonstrates “a degree of cultural sensitivity to
differing cultural norms surrounding conduct that in the United States is
considered bribery.”120 Take, for example, the statutory exception for “facilitating
or expediting”121 payments: the 1977 House Report on the FCPA explains that while
payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign official’s
duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they
are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the
United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.122

The report suggests that “host-country bribery is to some extent inevitable, and
even tolerable,” in the eyes of U.S. lawmakers. 123 This tolerance is even more
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 08-03 (July 11, 2008) (explaining that
the payment would cover reimbursement for economy class travel and one night’s lodging, which
was not to exceed $229 per journalist).
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powerfully apparent in the affirmative defense available where the bribe, or gift, is
legal under the “written laws and regulations” of the receiving country.124 Therefore,
FCPA defenders who rebut the charge of moral imperialism often raise the
exception and affirmative defenses as evidence that the FCPA, far from imposing
an American definition of corruption on the global market, in fact respects and
accommodates cultural differences.125
On a closer analysis, however, the exception and affirmative defenses
prescribed under the FCPA turn on a classic stereotype that views “developing and
transition economies” as inherently corrupt: it is okay, in the terms of this
stereotype, to bribe Africans and Latin Americans, who are non-Western, nonwhite, and non-Christian, because they are fundamentally immoral and corrupt.126
Notwithstanding the statutory exception for facilitating payments, Congress
conveys an overt tone of disdain toward such payments by using the word
“reprehensible.”127 The DOJ has also taken a dim view of the facilitating payments
exception. The FCPA Resource Guide expresses the DOJ’s disapproval of facilitating
payments and notes that the United States “encourages companies to prohibit or
discourage facilitating payments.”128 Although the exception does not exclusively
apply to business enterprises in emerging markets, since 1978, the FCPA
enforcement has focused primarily on emerging markets such as China, Nigeria,
Mexico, and Indonesia. 129 As a result, by carving out an exception for certain
corrupt behaviors believed to be prevalent “elsewhere,” the FCPA actually implicates
a racially- and geographically-based moralism: actions in emerging markets such as
Asia and Latin America do not bear the same moral weight that the same actions
would bear in the United States. 130 From this perspective, the FCPA’s statutory
tolerance of host-country bribery paradoxically reinforces negative stereotypes that
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view people in emerging markets as benighted barbarians who are simply incapable
of understanding less corrupt methods of conducting business and government.131
Carving out several exceptions to the FCPA does not seem to be a promising
solution to cultural conflicts in an anti-corruption campaign. On the one hand, the
FCPA’s statutory exception could be understood as a statement about non-U.S.
business culture made by U.S. legislators: Congress believes that the practice of
assuring or speeding the proper performance of a foreign official’s duties through
facilitating payments is to some extent inevitable, even deeply imbedded, in the
host-country business culture. This statement, however, is not necessarily the truth
of business cultures outside the United States.132 For example, Chinese anti-bribery
legislation does not differentiate between facilitating payments and other types of
bribes.133 Under Chinese criminal law, facilitating payments are just as prosecutable
as any other bribe.134 Therefore, in the Avon case, even if the payments to Chinese
government officials fall under the FCPA’s facilitating payments exception, they
probably will still subject Avon to sanctions under Chinese law—either
administrative or criminal penalties depending on the severity of the
circumstances. In that case, the application of the facilitating payments exception
will be significantly incongruent with the FCPA’s original legislative purpose in two
aspects: first, it fails to punish U.S. corporations’ overseas bribery, which is the
primary purpose of the FCPA; 135 second, it fails to accommodate differing hostcountry cultural norms, which is the primary policy goal of the statutory exception,
because there is no real conflict of cultural values between China and the United
States in regard to the prohibition of facilitating payments.
On the other hand, the FCPA’s exceptions for certain otherwise inculpatory
payments136 still exclude defendants’ introduction of any cultural evidence beyond
written laws, exposing the narrowness of the FCPA’s pretense to cultural
accommodation. Had the framers of the FCPA taken seriously issues of cultural
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conflicts, they would have devoted far more energy into the prerequisite question of
how to determine foreign culture. After all, how could FCPA prosecution and
litigation be truly culturally sensitive without allowing the introduction of any
empirical or sociological knowledge of foreign values and preferences?137 Moreover,
by denying the admission of cultural evidence submitted by defendants, the FCPA
is denying the agency of those who hold affiliations with a foreign market to make
their own cultural descriptions. Such cultural descriptions might be consistent
with, or contrary to, what is said in U.S. law, or they may contain information that
is beyond the U.S. legislators’ existing knowledge about a particular foreign culture.
In any case, allowing the introduction of cultural evidence, rather than simply
prescribing the contents of foreign culture as a given, would enable the FCPA
prosecutors and adjudicators to develop a more sophisticated and nuanced
knowledge of foreign culture before any culturally-sensitive decision is reached.
C. The Complexities of Cultural Conflicts in the Avon Case
This subsection presumes that U.S. courts consider the cultural background out
of which the case facts of FCPA cases emerge. It is necessary to clarify, first of all,
that the admission of a formal cultural defense does not mean that every defendant
should be exonerated. It only guarantees that the court gives proper weight to
cultural evidence at various stages of the legal process. Traditional literature on
cultural defense tends to focus on the admissibility of cultural evidence.138 To be
more specific, the focus has been on why a cultural defense should, or should not, be
allowed in the courtroom.139 There has been a dearth of research on how exactly to
deal with the complexities associated with the use of cultural defenses or even what
those complexities could be. In any case, the admission of cultural evidence is far
from the end of the story. The judge must still find a way to recognize, to
understand, to empathize with, and to evaluate the cultural conflicts before making
a legitimate judgment.
This subsection aims to excavate the cultural nuances and complexities
associated with the use of cultural defense in FCPA cases. Several hypothetical
expert testimonies from both sides—Avon and the FCPA prosecutors—will be
introduced. The goal of these adversarial testimonies is to present the concept of
culture as something dynamic, internally contested, and contextual. At the end of
Marianne Constable, Just Silences: The Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law 89
(2005) (“Modern law is a matter of fact. It is grounded in empirical investigation and informed by
sociological knowledge of values and preferences.”).
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this subsection, readers will develop a more concrete idea of the complexities of
cultural conflicts in FCPA cases.
1.

Avon’s multilayered cultural identity

The global economy offers opportunities for multinational corporations to
situate themselves within different cultural communities and to create layered
cosmopolitan identities. In fact, in this particular case, Avon might wish to
emphasize its connections with China, highlight the independence of Avon China
as a subsidiary company operating entirely on Chinese territory, and play down its
relevance to the United States. Although Avon is a U.S. corporation in a legal sense,
as a global corporation operating with more than one identity (in a cultural sense),
it might wish to assert and avail itself of its Chinese identity for this particular case.
Avon might even assert that its identity is bicultural, or multicultural, in nature,
and that it should be allowed to avail itself of the laws of both countries. Avon might
therefore claim the application of Chinese law and culture to some issues of the
dispute but U.S. law to the others. For example, Avon’s belief that the recipient
newspaper editor was only a temporary employee rather than a foreign official was
based on its understanding of the relevant Chinese regulations and Chinese
government structures. Therefore, Avon might ask the court to apply Chinese law
to decide whether the newspaper editor qualifies a foreign official in order for the
case to fall within the FCPA’s jurisdiction. At the same time, Avon’s belief (while it
could be wrong) that most of the gifts and payments, such as trips to Avon’s research
facilities and gifts imprinted with Avon’s logos, were to secure the issuance of
business licenses and therefore should be exempted from bribery charges was based
on an understanding of the exceptions and affirmative defenses prescribed under
the FCPA. 140 Therefore, Avon might ask the court to apply the FCPA to decide
whether certain gifts and payments should be excused. The argument that different
issues of a case shall be governed by the laws of different countries is a natural
consequence, even an appropriate recognition, of the fact that business decisions of
transnational corporations are often informed by more than one culture and the
competing normative orderings of each.141 This is not to say that the application of
the law of different countries to the same case is good or bad. Rather, it might
simply be an unintended result of the complicated and multi-faceted cultural
identities of transnational actors in the era of globalization.
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2. Avon’s Expert Testimony: Introducing the culture of guanxi and
gift giving
Avon’s assertion that the gifts and payments were used to cultivate reciprocal,
longer-term guanxi with government officials might sound irrelevant to a U.S.
judge. After all, there is no such concept of guanxi in U.S. legal systems. Even if
guanxi could be literally translated as “special relationships” or “interconnections
among people,” neither the exception nor the affirmative defenses prescribed under
the FCPA exempt relation-based gift giving from bribery charges.142 Yet what seems
irrelevant to U.S. legal systems finds considerable support in a Chinese cultural
context. Therefore, one strategy for Avon is to raise a cultural defense that its giftgiving practices accord with Chinese culture of guanxi and the related gift-giving
rituals.
Let us assume that Expert A, an anthropologist, served as an expert witness for
Avon and testified as follows. Guanxi, which roughly translates as “personal
connection, relationship, or network,” plays a central role in Chinese society.143 In
fact, guanxi constitutes a foundation of the philosophy of Confucianism, which has
dominated Chinese mainstream ideology for more than two thousand years.144 The
essence of Confucianism lies in its acknowledgement of, and respect for,
relationships.145 Such relationships, however, have wide cultural implications that
are different in kind and intensity from comparable behavior in Western
societies.146
Guanxi is formed when two independent individuals, or entities, establish a
connection to enable a bilateral flow of transactions.147 Both parties must benefit
from the transactions, however, to make sure that the proper operation of guanxi is
maintained.148 In other words, guanxi is based on the principle of reciprocity. There
are two major differences between guanxi and networking patterns in the United
States.
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First, the time orientation is different.149 Chinese people tend to evaluate social
transactions within a long-term balance sheet.150 To borrow the words from one
executive, “[e]very guanxi relationship is regarded as ‘stock’ to be put away in times
of abundance and plenty. The ‘stock’ will then be at their disposal in times of need
and trouble.”151 When one side asks a favor from the other, the debt is expected to
be paid off sometime in the future rather than immediately, and such a
temporary disequilibrium is precisely the key to maintaining guanxi. 152 Once the
debit and credit sides of the balance sheet are in equilibrium, the guanxi relationship
often comes to an end.153 Therefore, the maintenance of guanxi relies on a dynamic
equilibrium between debits and credits in continuous, long-term interactions. 154
American social transactions, in contrast, are usually evaluated in isolated
occurrences, the objective of which is to maintain equilibrium in each transaction.155
From this point of view, Avon’s argument that the gifts were not for any immediate
rent-seeking return, but to cultivate continuous, longer-term relationships with
influential Chinese government officials, finds support in the Chinese cultural
context.
Second, the role institutional law plays in Chinese society is different from the
role it plays in Western society. The philosophy of Confucianism prefers
governance by ethics over governance by law.156 This preference largely results in a
general reverence for personal power rather than institutional authorities in China,
because those who occupy positions of authority often have the power to determine
what is permissible in Chinese society.157 Western observers often find that Chinese
business transactions rely on guanxi rather than on legal institutions, and that legal
rules and contractual agreements are often easily broken or evaded by people of
influence. 158 This is not to say that formal legal rules do not play any role in
successful business operations in China. Rather, it is perhaps more appropriate to
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consider guanxi and legal institutions as complementary.159 In practice, guanxi is
often considered as the “informal mediating mechanism” used to achieve
constructive business results when the formal legal system itself fails to function
properly.160
Since the practice of guanxi emphasizes personal power, it is often subject to
two uncertainties: the person with whom guanxi has been established and the power
on which guanxi relies. One party of guanxi might cease to be available to the other
for various reasons, such as the decline of personal ties or even the breakdown of a
relationship. Therefore, although modern guanxi practices function mostly for
instrumental purposes in business context, the guanxi relationship must still
possess some affective components to maintain its warmth.161 In China, a stable
guanxi with strong sentimental attachments is cultivated through continuous, longterm reciprocal interactions, which often involves gift giving on important personal
events or festivals.162 Long-term sentimental attachments, in turn, further provide
moral justifications for gift giving as an appropriate expression of reciprocity. 163
This accounts for Avon’s gifts to Chinese government officials for their personal
events, such as wedding ceremonies, funerals, and college-entrance celebrations
for their kids, because celebrating personal events often helps enhance the intensity
of guanxi.
Moreover, the proper operation of guanxi is also subject to other superior or
competing sources of power.164 Therefore, foreign investors wish to establish guanxi
with local government officials who have the real decisive power in their respective
positions. In practice, guanxi with influential government officials constitutes an
important competitive advantage for MNCs doing business in China, as guanxi with
higher-level officials often means access to better resources.165 The United States,
in contrast, relies primarily on formal legal regimes to ensure smooth business
transactions.166 This is not to say that the instrumental use of personal relationships
is not common in U.S. business; but personal acquaintance is not as decisive a factor
Lubman, supra note 146, at 72; Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From
Contradiction to Complementarity, in Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture and
the Changing Nature of Guanxi 179, 183 (Thomas Gold et al. eds., 2002).

159

160

Potter, supra note 159, at 195.

161

See Thomas Gold et al., supra note 143.

162

Wen, supra note 74, at 521.

163

Id.

164

Lubman, supra note 146, at 72.

165

Yeung & Tung, supra note 145, at 59–61.

166

Id., at 56.

278

DEALING WITH U.S.-CHINA CULTURAL
CONFLICTS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT

for successful business transactions in Western society, and the culture of
“impersonal” business developed earlier and faster in the West than in China.167
Both theoretical and empirical research shows that establishing strong guanxi
with the right persons is crucial to business success in China.168 Generally speaking,
the significance of guanxi decreases over the life of the business.169 During the initial
stages of opening the Chinese market, guanxi networks usually play a crucial role.170
Beyond a certain threshold level, other conditions assume greater importance in
sustaining success, such as technical competence, capital, and product quality,
etc. 171 Companies and scholars usually attribute the significance of guanxi in
business contexts to the defects of Chinese legislation—Chinese business laws tend
to be ambiguous and are open to interpretation by those who have authority or
power.172
Based on the DOJ’s investigation, most of the events incriminating Avon China
took place between 2004 and 2008, when China gradually lifted its ban on direct
selling. 173 During that time, Chinese legislation and regulations governing the
reimplementation of direct selling were not yet mature. In fact, China’s first Direct
Selling Administration Ordinance officially took effect on December 1, 2005, eight
months after Avon China was granted its first temporary license to conduct direct
sales in China.174 In the absence of complete legislation, MOFCOM and AIC were
responsible for the interpretation and implementation of direct-selling regulations,
and they enjoyed considerable discretion in selecting the first company to receive a
test license of direct selling. Based on the above considerations, Avon China’s
decision to build guanxi with government officials of MOFCOM and AIC was
reasonable, even necessary, in terms of facilitating its application for direct-selling
licenses.
A more morally confusing aspect of guanxi, however, is gift giving, which serves
as the most common method of building as well as maintaining guanxi in business
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contexts. 175 In order to build guanxi, two hitherto discrete individuals must
establish a basis of familiarity and trust to enable subsequent transactions.176 Since
the majority of foreign investors are not related to Chinese officials by blood or
geographic origin, most have to rely on gift giving to cultivate and maintain a
mutually committed guanxi relationship. Gifts represent good will, respect, and
sentimental attachments.177 Gift exchanges in Chinese culture are not only a matter
of ritual but also an important social norm.178 Gift giving has many variations, such
as entertainment at banquets, cash gifts in the form of “red envelopes,” which are
part of a customary practice of giving monetary gifts wrapped in a red envelope
during holidays or special personal events, and overseas trips. In fact, lavish
banquets were so common at one time that it was no exaggeration to say that no
guanxi could be established “without meat and wine.” 179 In an interview with
nineteen Hong Kong and non-Hong Kong firms that conduct business in China, all
participant companies admitted that they had given gifts in various forms in the
course of guanxi building and maintenance.180 Therefore, Avon China’s gifts and
payments aligned with Chinese cultural practices and, as long as not explicitly
prohibited by Chinese law, were acceptable to business dealings in Chinese market.
3. DOJ’s Expert Testimony: The polytemporal dimensions of culture
The DOJ confronted the defendants with the testimony of two opposing
experts, Expert B and Expert C, aiming to prove to the court that there is still no
universally agreed upon definition of guanxi and its associated gift-giving practices.
This subsection first discusses the testimony of Expert B, which emphasizes the
withered significance of guanxi in China, especially since President Xi Jinping came
to power. By pointing out the transition of cultural norms in a different historical
period, Expert B highlights the polytemporal dimensions of culture: a cultural
practice might have different connotations in different periods, or it may fall into
desuetude in a particular era.
For a particular defendant in a cultural defense case, a once-revered cultural
practice in reliance on which actions were committed or relationships were formed
might change, cease to exist, or even be officially outlawed by the time of litigation.
Lawyers frame this problem as one of conflict of laws in time, or intertemporal
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conflicts law, which occurs within the confines of a single jurisdiction whenever a
new law affects past relationships or conduct in reliance on prior law.181 When an
intertemporal conflict of laws arises, the court must determine whether the new law
applies retroactively to affect previously-established rights.182 In a cultural defense
litigation, the introduction of a time factor means that the court must evaluate not
only the cultural values of a foreign community, but also what those values are
within a specific historical period. Accordingly, the problem now under
consideration is not only whether the forum should defer to the cultural norms of a
foreign community to effectuate its policies, but, as a deeper and more nuanced
inquiry, whether the foreign community itself is still interested in effectuating such
policies as were in existence in a past historical period. The result of this inquiry
might well be that recent changes in the domestic laws and policies of China
destroyed any real conflict of interest between China and the United States with
regard to anti-corruption efforts, and so any real problem of cultural conflicts in this
particular case.
Let us assume that the Expert B’s testimony comprised the following. The
significance of guanxi and its associated gift-giving practices have been reduced
dramatically since China’s current president, Xi Jinping, came to power. In late
2012, President Xi launched his anti-corruption campaign to clean up the endemic
corruption he believed to pose a serious threat to the ruling Communist Party.183
This campaign especially targeted Party officials involved in power-for-money deals
by imposing more stringent scrutiny, more severe punishments, and more detailed
regulations. 184 For example, the anti-extravagance campaign called for a “frugal
working style,” strictly prohibiting government officials from spending public
funding on luxury goods and extravagant banquets.185 Moreover, President Xi, as
the General Secretary of the Communist Party, adopted the Eight-Point Regulation
of the Centre (hereinafter the “Eight-Point Regulation”) which sought to combat the
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culture of bureaucracy and extravagance that had eroded Chinese officialdom and
to purify the atmosphere among Party members. 186 The Eight-Point Regulation
provides, in particular, that officials’ visits to foreign countries should only be
arranged when absolutely necessary, with fewer accompanying members.187
In response to the Eight-Point Regulation, the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which serves as the highest internal control
institution of the CPC, further required that Party officials follow the Six
Prohibitions.188 The Six Prohibitions provides a much more detailed guideline for
the anti-extravagance campaign and more specifically targets gift-giving practices
among officials and bureaucrats. 189 The Six Prohibitions strictly prohibits, for
example, gift exchanges among Party and government organs at all levels. 190
Government officials are also strictly prohibited from receiving and giving gifts, gift
money, or payment documents in any form that may affect the proper performance
of duties.191 Moreover, the Six Prohibitions specifically stipulates that government
officials shall not take advantage of such personal events as weddings and funerals
to siphon off money.192
President Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign is against not only the
endemic corruption within Party and government officials but also foreign bribery
cases involving MNCs.193 In fact, before President Xi came to power, China lacked
a specific legal framework for the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery.
There seemed to be a tacit tolerance of, if not an official immunity from prosecution
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for, foreign bribery in China before 2013.194 For example, from 2003 to 2013, a total
of twenty-four FCPA cases were handled by the DOJ that were related to bribery of
government officials in China.195 None of the defendants in these cases, however,
were investigated or prosecuted under Chinese law.196 This situation has changed
significantly in recent years. The Chinese government’s 2013 prosecution of
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), a UK-registered multinational pharmaceutical firm,
marked a milestone for the enforcement of anti-corruption policies against foreign
companies in China. 197 By 2013, a seven-month investigation conducted by the
Chinese government revealed that, at least between 2004 and 2010, GSK was
offering monetary gifts or property to state-owned hospitals, clinical institutions,
and doctors across the country with the purpose of facilitating the sale of GSK
drugs. 198 In 2014, the Changsha Intermediate People’s Court of Hunan province
fined GSK 3 billion RMB (approximately $479 million), which was the largest fine
ever imposed by a Chinese court. 199 This marks a significant change of Chinese
official attitude towards foreign bribery in China: until this case, the Chinese
government had focused only on the demand side (the Party and government
officials who receive the bribe), but not the supply side (the payor) in foreign bribery
cases. The Chinese state-controlled media hailed the GSK case as a triumph of the
rule of law, blaming MNCs for taking advantage of China’s vulnerable legal system
to earn illegal benefits.200 Since 2013, China’s mainstream media have singled out
foreign MNCs as the prime culprits in commercial bribery, sending unmistakable
signals to foreign investors that China would no longer exempt them from bribery
prosecution.201
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On December 26, 2012, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate jointly issued the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning
Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery Cases
(hereinafter “the 2013 Interpretation”).202 This Interpretation became effective on
January 1, 2013, focusing primarily on the supply side of bribes.203 Article 1 of the
2013 Interpretation provides that “[a]ny person who pays a bribe of more than
RMB10,000 to a state functionary to seek improper benefits shall be investigated for
criminal liability in accordance with Article 390 of the PRC Criminal Law.”204 Article
12 further defines the seeking of improper benefits as seeking benefits that are in
violation of law, regulation, rule or policy, or requesting any state functionaries to
provide any assistance or convenience in violation of law, regulation, rule, policy or
industrial standards. 205 Moreover, Article 12 states that seeking competitive
advantage in economic, organizational, personnel, administrative and other
activities in violation of principles of justice and fairness shall be deemed seeking
improper benefits. 206 The promulgation of the 2013 Interpretation by China’s
highest court and prosecutorial organ sends a strong signal to the market that China
is intensifying its crackdown on payors of commercial bribes.
The various applicable Chinese anti-bribery Party disciplines and laws, the
general anti-extravagancy climate of contemporary Chinese society, along with
high-profile bribery cases against large MNCs clearly suggest that the inauguration
of President Xi began a new anti-corruption era of China. The gift-giving culture
that once prevailed among all levels of Chinese bureaucracy and foreign business
actors before 2013 now is specifically singled out as a primary target of anticorruption investigation. Therefore, evidence proffered by Avon China that it is a
customary Chinese practice, even a demand of Chinese business culture, for foreign
corporations to build guanxi with Chinese local government officials and to cultivate
such guanxi relationships with cash, gifts, banquets, travel, and entertainment in
various forms, should not be admitted by the court. Even if foreign investors such
as Avon used to receive much more favorable treatment in regard to anti-bribery
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investigations and prosecutions in China, China’s official attitude towards foreign
bribery over recent years has shifted from one of de facto foreign corporate
impunity to one of zero tolerance.207 As a result, the argument that Avon China’s
gift-giving practices in China are vulnerable to the risk of prosecution only under
the FCPA, but are acceptable under the Chinese legal system, should not be
admitted by the court.
It is necessary to clarify, however, that it is not the purpose of this testimony to
predict the decline of guanxi and its associated gift-giving practices in China as an
inevitable trend. In fact, a non-essentialist historical perspective on culture
recognizes that the nature and manifestation of guanxi is under constant change.208
This testimony therefore does not preclude the possibility that guanxi practices will
adapt to China’s new social order and flourish in evolving forms in the businessgovernment realm. Whatever form it may take, however, the traditional practice of
guanxi conflicts with the official law of China, at least after President Xi came to
power in 2013, so long as it is manipulated as a power-for-money deal to further
unfair competition.
4. DOJ Expert Testimony: The internal divergence within a culture
To further rebut Avon’s oversimplistic description of Chinese culture and its
argument that what is considered bribery in the United States is totally acceptable
in China, the DOJ introduced the testimony of Expert C, aiming to demonstrate to
the court that there is still no consensus as to what constitutes a socially and legally
acceptable gift-giving culture in China. In fact, the concept of guanxi is rather
complicated and multilayered.209 In a business context, since Chinese government
officials and foreign MNC investors often lack a mutual societal foundation, there
is little space for them within the guanxi relationship to draw upon stable
sentimental connections or interpersonal trust in exchange for future assistance
and favors.210 As a result, guanxi participants in business contexts tend to rely on
exchanges of power and personal benefits to maintain the proper operation of their
relationship.211 The dividing line between legitimate guanxi give-and-take and an
illegitimate power-for-money deal, however, is very blurry and has troubled the
Chinese government until today. There is no simple yes-or-no answer to the
207
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question of whether guanxi and gift giving are acceptable cultural practices even
within the Chinese community itself, as the answer always depends on a case-bycase analysis.
Expert C’s testimony can be summarized as follows. With the development of
China’s economy, guanxi relationships take on more diversified forms and are often
so tightly knitted into commercial bribery cases that even Chinese lawmakers find
it hard to distinguish between healthy guanxi-related gift giving and rent-seeking
bribery. In 2008, in order to deal with the complexities of guanxi-based culture in
China’s antibribery judicial practice, the Supreme People’s Court and Procuratorate
of China collectively issued the Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in Commercial Bribery Cases (hereinafter “2008 Commercial
Bribery Opinion”). 212 Article 10 of the 2008 Commercial Bribery Opinion deals
specifically with the demarcation between bribery and healthy guanxi-related gift
giving in Chinese judicial practice.213 It requires that prosecutors and judges take
into consideration the following factors when distinguishing between bribes and
normal gifts: (a) the context of gift exchanges, such as the basis of the relationship
between the payor and the recipient, e.g., whether they are related by blood or
friendship, and the intensity of their past course of dealings; (b) the value of the gifts
or payment; (c) why, when, and how the gifts were exchanged and whether the payor
made any requests in connection with the recipient’s official duty; and (d) whether
the recipient actually repaid the payor by using his or her position in a corrupt
way. 214 As a whole, Article 10 of the 2008 Commercial Bribery Opinion
acknowledges the complex nature of guanxi-based gift-giving practices, seeking to
offer more flexibility to the courts and procuratorates in dealing with the
complexities arising from guanxi-related bribes. Therefore, it is at least utopian,
even incorrect, to assume that there exists a so-called guanxi, or gift-giving, culture
in China that is totally accepted by the Chinese society, as guanxi-based gift giving
is so intertwined with bribery that the difference between the two can only be
determined on a painstaking case-by-case basis.
Moreover, Avon’s allegation that the so-called gift-giving culture is well
accepted in China is not backed up by any comprehensive quantitative analysis of
people’s perceptions and attitudes about gift giving across different social classes.
212
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Avon failed to present carefully targeted empirical data regarding whether ordinary
Chinese people—including low-level public employees, peasants, rural migrant
workers in big cities, blue-collar workers, and unemployed people living below the
poverty line—are content with the gift-giving culture espoused by Chinese
government elites and their Western business partners. In fact, Chinese elite
networks composed of party-state officials and entrepreneurs have long been
believed to be the source of corruption in post-Mao China.215 Such elite networks
are built particularly through everyday forms of sociality involving banqueting,
entertaining, and various forms of gift exchanges, which fall exactly under those
behaviors strictly prohibited by China’s anti-extravagancy campaign. 216 This
discrepancy of opinion largely explains why reaction to President Xi’s antiextravagancy campaign has been mixed: it enjoys popular support among most
ordinary Chinese but has generated discontent among government elites. 217
Therefore, Avon’s argument that guanxi-based gift giving is a widely accepted
cultural practice in China should not be admitted by the court.
III. APPLYING A PLURALISTIC CONFLICT-OF-LAWS APPROACH TO THE
AVON CASE

With all the cultural nuances and complexities in mind, this section works
through the Avon case once more in accordance with a pluralistic conflict-of-laws
approach. Following each step of a conflicts analysis, readers will see how this
approach makes cultural conflicts legally articulable in the context of FCPA cases,
and how it captures a crucial insight of modern cultural anthropology—that
culture is dynamic, internally contested, and contextual—in this process.218
A. Pleading and Proving Foreign Law—How Culture Is Seen and Ascertained
The first step of a conflicts analysis is to determine whether the case involves a
foreign element, so that a reasonable doubt as to the application of law may arise.
The pertinence of Chinese law is apparent in the Avon case from its outset. Avon
China allegedly bribed Chinese governmental officials while operating in China,
John Osburg, Making Business Personal: Corruption, Anti-corruption, and Elite Networks in PostMao China, 59 Curr. Anthropol. 149, 149 (2018).
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and the FCPA states that it shall be an affirmative defense if Avon China’s conduct
is lawful under Chinese law. 219 Nevertheless, in the United States, and in other
common-law countries, a party intending to raise an issue about rules of a foreign
system bears the burden of invoking and proving them.220 Judges are not required
to, and in judicial practice most of them choose not to, undertake their own research
on foreign law.221 If neither party raises the issue of foreign law, or provides proof
of its content, most courts will apply the law of the forum.222 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.1 provides:
Determination of foreign law. A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign
law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.223

The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 44.1 further provides that, in
establishing the content of foreign law,
the court is not limited by material presented by the parties; it may engage in its own
research and consider any relevant material thus found. The court may have at its
disposal better foreign law materials than counsel have presented, or may wish to
reexamine and amplify material that has been presented by counsel in partisan fashion
or in insufficient detail. On the other hand, the court is free to insist on a complete
presentation by counsel.224

Rule 44.1 provides procedural guidance for U.S. federal courts in the adjudication
of foreign law claims. The following analysis will therefore be based primarily on
this rule.
Under a conflicts analysis, the process of proving foreign laws seeks to go
beyond positive rules and to take all the elements that constitute the “living law” of
a foreign country into consideration, which includes unofficial forms of ordering
such as social customs.225 By doing so, conflicts analysis reveals how a particular
foreign law is applied in practice; captures the possible inconsistencies between law
on the books and law in action; and ultimately understands to what extent the
219
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involved value systems are similar or different, compatible or incompatible,
fulfilling the same or diverse policy goals.226 According to Rule 44.1, for example,
the court may consider any material or resource regardless of its potential
admissibility and source of origin.227 While expert testimony is the most common
way to prove foreign law, both sides of the Avon case are allowed to submit any other
information they deem helpful, including secondary sources such as texts, learned
journals, and various unauthenticated documents relevant to Chinese anti-bribery
policies.228 In order to ascertain relevant norms on guanxi and gift giving, both sides
may submit supporting findings from the social science literature, news reports,
public statements made by the Chinese government, or interviews of corporate
managers who have done business in China. All these materials help to present
China’s anti-corruption system not only as a collection of black-letter rules, but as
an interplay among multiple normative regimes operating on both state and nonstate levels.
In addition to party submissions, the court can undertake independent
research to fill gaps or doubts left by the materials presented before it.229 Engaged
in a subject that deals specifically with foreign-related legal disputes, conflicts
lawyers are experienced in researching the law of a country whose official language
is not English. For example, conflicts lawyers often turn to comparative law
methodologies for information about foreign law. 230 In comparative law, the
functional method turns out to be a strong tool in the hands of conflicts lawyers to
understand and compare different cultures.231 In cases where a foreign normative
system is completely unknown, or has no direct equivalent in the forum, the
functional method searches for foreign law not by abstract legal terms or doctrinal

See Mathias Reimann, Comparative Law and Private International Law, in Oxford Handbook
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226

227

28 U.S.C.A. Rule 44.1.

In re Arb. Between Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp.
266, 275 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (describing the range of materials to which a court can look).

228

229

Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.

See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law and Private International Law, in Encyclopedia of Private
International Law 417 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017); see also Ralf Michaels, The Functional
Method of Comparative Law, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 339, 342 (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).

230

Reimann, supra note 226, at 1387; Michaels, Comparative Law and Private International Law,
supra note 230, at 420–23.

231

289

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:2 (2022)

structures, but by events. 232 That is, each research question is formulated by
presenting a case and then asking questions, such as how foreign legal systems react
to a particular situation.233
In the Avon case, before collecting information on Chinese law, it should be
noted that what is characterized as a matter of criminal law under the FCPA may be
subject to civil liability, administrative penalty, or Party disciplines in China.
Likewise, Chinese law may use different terminologies to describe activities that are
termed “bribery” under U.S. law. 234 Therefore, instead of asking how the PRC
Criminal Law regulates bribery, the functional method asks how gift exchanges
between business investors and government officials are regulated in China.
Different conflicts lawyers might design research questions in different ways, but
the key insight is to focus on factual situations rather than on concepts or
terminologies. Once the research question is designed appropriately, the court may
refer to a wide variety of official and unofficial resources for answers. The whole
process should enable the court to identify all relevant foreign norms that
functionally resemble the FCPA before engaging in a meaningful choice-of-law
analysis.
A conflict-of-laws approach to the ascertainment of foreign law presents its
own concerns. These concerns, however, are precisely where this approach
captures crucial cultural insights. The first obvious concern entails the
establishment of foreign law through each party’s declarations. Under Rule 44.1,
even though the court can conduct its own research, it is also “free to insist on a
complete presentation by counsel” 235 of the relevant content of foreign law. The
objectivity and neutrality of each party’s presentation is often questionable because
they may submit evidence in a partisan fashion — only hiring experts whose
See Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, supra note 230, at 342 (“functionalist
comparative law is factual, it focuses not on rules but on their effects, not on doctrinal structures
and arguments, but on events.”); see also Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., Formation of Contracts—A
Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems: Introduction, 2 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1, 31 (1968) (The “factual
method” of functionalist comparative law was adopted by the Cornell Project on the Formation of
Contract, a comparative research project directed by Rudolf Schlesinger).
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testimony is consistent with their positions, disregarding those who hold contrary
views. Avon China might present the court with empirical studies on guanxi
between Chinese government elites and their Western business partners,
disregarding those studies conducted among lower-level Chinese government
officials, local private enterprises, and common Chinese citizens, which may reveal
more negative perceptions of the guanxi culture. Sometimes, a litigant may
purposefully avoid the application of foreign law by not raising the choice-of-law
question to the court or by not proving the foreign law at issue to the court’s
satisfaction. A litigant may even deliberately confuse the court, by painting an
overly complicated picture of foreign culture with conflicting evidence, in the hope
that the court will apply forum law or dismiss the case on the ground of forum non
conveniens. 236 These are all legitimate concerns, but the conflicts approach, by
vesting the initiative of pleading and proving foreign law in the hands of the
litigants, also gives them the agency to decide whether to claim their affiliations
with one culture or another, as well as an opportunity to articulate their own
descriptions of a specific cultural phenomenon.237
The issue-by-issue analysis adopted by the conflicts approach is even more
conducive to a nuanced appreciation of the defendants’ multi-layered cultural
identities. In conflicts, if a case involves more than one issue, a separate choice-oflaw inquiry must be made with regard to each issue. 238 Applying the law of a
jurisdiction to one issue does not mean that the same law will be applied to other
aspects of a case.239 Litigants and their attorneys often have to carefully compare all
the applicable laws of competing jurisdictions, determining whether to put foreign
law in issue for certain aspects of their case. If the court, after going through each
step of conflicts analysis, applies the laws of different jurisdictions to different
issues of a case, the resulting phenomenon is called dépeçage.240 When Avon China
argues that an editor working as a temporary employee of a government-owned
newspaper does not qualify as a foreign official, it situates itself within Chinese law.
Avon China may choose to prove to the court that, according to the PRC Criminal
Law, persons who work for state-owned companies but do not perform public

Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door
to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 887, 891, 911 (2011).
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duties are not government officials. 241 Under Chinese law, public duties usually
refer to those activities that lead, guide, supervise and manage public affairs. 242
Avon China offered the editor cash gifts on the understanding that he did not
engage in any of the public duties mentioned above and that he was only a
temporary employee of that newspaper.
At the same time, Avon China may also seek to avail itself of the “facilitating or
expediting payments”243 exception and the “reasonable and bona fide expenditure
defense”244 prescribed under the FCPA. Possible strategies that Avon China could
adopt have been discussed in Section II.B.1. For example, it could argue that most
of the gifts, such as mooncakes, skin-care products, and vintage wines, carried
Avon’s name or logo and were used to promote its products. Avon China offered
these gifts on the understanding that, under U.S. law, it is exempted from criminal
liability because of the “reasonable and bona fide expenditure defense.”245 It would
therefore seem that the conflicts approach to the proof of foreign law is easily
manipulated by the litigants to shop around for the most favorable laws: Avon China
seeks to attain the most favorable results by invoking Chinese law only on those
issues where it would benefit, sticking to forum law on all other issues.
Nevertheless, the conflicts approach also captures the insight that transnational
actors, rather than being stuck only within the culture of their home countries, live
and act between cultures in different aspects of their lives. Their conduct is often
informed by, and takes place within, more than one culture, and sometimes they
may realize in hindsight that they were in one value system while living in
accordance with the norms of another. The conflicts approach does not decide for
transnational actors who they are. Rather, it gives them agency to assert their own
complex cultural positions when acting across borders. In the Avon case, it is also
possible that Avon China may not raise the issue of Chinese law at all regarding the
241
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identity of that Chinese editor: Avon China’s understanding of the nature of that
editor’s identity might have been shaped by U.S. norms, and it might argue that a
temporary employee of state-run news media does not fall within the definition of
“foreign official” under the FCPA. In any case, the conflicts approach offers Avon
China the autonomy to have a say as to the cultural context within which its
decisions will be understood — and the legal context within which they will be
adjudicated.
In an adversarial system, the inaccuracy associated with partisanship is usually
minimized because both parties can fully present any evidence about foreign law to
the court. 246 The adversarial process of proving foreign law also echoes with the
insight that culture is internally contested rather than monolithic. In the Avon case,
the litigants have presented conflicting descriptions and interpretations of the
culture of guanxi, primarily through competing expert testimonies which reflect
attitudes toward gift giving at different levels of Chinese society. While Avon China
presents how guanxi is perceived among Western investors, the DOJ draws the
court’s attention to a multitude of other participants in guanxi networks and how
they might have experienced the same culture differently. The culture of guanxi
must also be proved as of a specific time. Guanxi practices before President Xi took
office may differ from those at different times under his leadership, and they are
still evolving as China’s political, social, and economic reforms continue to unfold.
In the Avon case, as well as in other cases where a cultural defense is invoked, each
party aims not at depicting an accurate or whole picture of certain cultural
practices, but at making claims in furtherance of its own case. Even all the evidence
before the court combined may not necessarily tell the whole story of a culture, as
the litigants cannot fully represent the views of all cultural participants at all times.
Therefore, a court dealing with foreign cultures engages in a task that is
paradoxical in nature. It must make claims about a foreign value system,
recognizing that the content of that value system cannot be fully ascertained. A
conflicts approach responds to this challenge by denying the force of stare decisis to
prior court decisions on the content of foreign law.247 It treats court decisions on
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foreign law as findings of fact, or “quasi-fact,”248 in the sense that they are highly
case-specific and therefore should have no binding force except between the
litigants as to the particular case.249 The court sitting before the Avon case is aware
that different courts may interpret the culture of guanxi differently and hence its
conclusion is not the authentic one. It appreciates the impossibility of a
comprehensive understanding of guanxi and carefully limits its inquiry to those
aspects of Chinese culture that would materially affect the outcome of the Avon
case.
For example, the court might only examine how guanxi is practiced and
perceived in a business-to-government context. It may further limit its inquiry to
the rules of guanxi followed by Western investors and higher-level Chinese
government officials. What the court applies ultimately is not the Chinese culture
of guanxi, but a particular version of guanxi that will make cultural conflicts legally
articulable in the Avon case, and that will only bind Avon, Avon China, and the DOJ
with respect to this particular charge of bribery. 250 By limiting its judgment on
guanxi to a specific case scenario, the court also avoids becoming entangled in the
larger socio-political debate on whether the logic of personalistic networks trumps
that of rational-legal economic relations, or even whether Chinese capitalism
trumps Western capitalism.251 This is achieved precisely by the “as if” modality of
conflicts analysis.252 Conflicts lawyers recognize and accept the limitations of what
can be known cross-culturally, carefully restricting cultural claims to those that can
be supported by the facts at hand. In the Avon case, the court is fully aware of the
impossibility of understanding the larger political conflicts between China’s state-

See Knop et al., supra note 13, at 630 (mentioning that at common law, traditional conflicts
theory treated issues of foreign law as a question of fact. Even though Rule 44.1 provides that the
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directed mixed economy and the American way of capitalism: the specifics of such
conflicts are often undefinable and irresolvable. Nevertheless, it acts as if such
conflicts could be phrased, defined, and ultimately resolved, at least between these
specific litigants in this specific case.
B. Allocating Contacts—Dealing with Cosmopolitan Cultural Identities
In practice, foreign issuers have been prosecuted even when the corrupt scheme
in question neither originated nor was completed within U.S. borders. 253 In
practice, the United States can subject MNCs to the FCPA based on a mere
tangential connection between the bribery and its territory. In fact, the DOJ and
SEC have asserted that the following connections between a foreign issuer and the
U.S. are enough to claim FCPA jurisdiction:
placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax from, to, or through
the United States involves interstate commerce—as does sending a wire transfer from
or to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state
borders or internationally to or from the United States.254

In contrast, a conflicts approach gives due consideration to the multiple
contacts that exist between the parties, the alleged bribery events, and the relevant
jurisdictions.255 It assigns contacts to each jurisdiction involved and applies the law
of the jurisdiction that has the “most significant relationship” to the occurrence and
the parties in issue.256 Thus, a conflicts approach resonates with a cosmopolitan
vision of cultural identity which recognizes citizens’ multiple affiliations with the
world beyond their local borders, as well as the spatial expansion of their rights and
duties arising therefrom.257 A conflicts lawyer would notice numerous connections
between the Avon case and China: Avon China operates in China; the alleged bribery
recipients are Chinese government officials; the Corporate Affairs Group, an
internal department of Avon China responsible for establishing and maintaining
guanxi with Chinese officials, is composed primarily of local Chinese employees;
most of the alleged bribery schemes took place or originated within Chinese
territory; and most of the alleged bribes (monetary payments and tangible financial
assets) were from China. Multiple contacts also exist between this case and the U.S.:
Avon China is a wholly owned subsidiary of Avon, a U.S. company; certain alleged
Annelisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA under International Law, 51
Willamette L. Rev. 225, 226 (2015).
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bribes carried Avon’s name or logo; and the alleged bribes included travel to and
within the United States.
China arguably has a greater number of contacts with this case than the United
States. However, a conflicts approach seeks to perform a qualitative, rather than
quantitative, evaluation of each contact. 258 As the next subsection will show, a
qualitative evaluation analyzes the relative significance of each contact in light of its
role in furthering the underlying policies of the laws of the contact states. 259
Therefore, the FCPA may be applied even if the U.S. has a smaller number of
connections with Avon China and its bribery scheme, so long as those few
connections make the U.S. reasonably concerned with the effectuation of its antibribery policies in this particular case. By the same token, Chinese law and culture
may not be applied even though China otherwise has the greatest number of
contacts with the Avon case, especially if none of these contacts arouses China’s
interest in enforcing its laws against the particular defendant corporation(s). Hence
a conflicts approach is different from Salbu’s proposal, which overemphasizes the
significance of a single contact, namely the place where bribery occurred, and
completely rejects the FCPA’s jurisdiction over any payment of bribes abroad.260
Under a standard conflicts analysis, which deals exclusively with state-made
laws, courts mainly consider territorial and nationality-based contacts.261 Under a
pluralistic conflicts approach, however, courts must also consider other possible
contacts that may connect people with various, sometimes non-state, cultural
communities.262 In the Avon case, if the court recognizes that guanxi is a crucial
system of beliefs in Chinese culture, it may think of those who share and practice
these beliefs as a cultural community. Although this cultural community mainly
exists and operates within Chinese territory, its norms are not generated by the
official legislative system of China, nor does the binding force of its rules depend on
state power. That is, people who share common experiences of guanxi form a
cultural community that is non-state in nature. The court must then consider what
contacts exist between the defendant corporations and the guanxi community.
One possible connecting factor is community membership. The court may find
that although the defendants are U.S. corporations, they nonetheless share a core
set of beliefs, patterns of behavior and values with local Chinese when they are
engaged in guanxi-related practices. To view the defendant corporations as
258
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members of the guanxi community is to acknowledge that they are active
participants and not passive recipients in the culture of guanxi. A pluralistic
conflicts approach recognizes that MNCs belong to various cultural communities or
groups besides their own home culture. Being a member of a cultural community
does not necessarily require loyalty.263 MNCs “are permitted to shift identities amid
a plurality of possible affiliations and allegiances” as their businesses move from
place to place.264 A pluralistic conflicts approach also recognizes that people with
different nationalities or other political affiliations can nevertheless form a
common cultural community.265 Therefore, MNCs from all over the world can be
members of the guanxi community, at least when they manage their Chinese
businesses following guanxi-related norms. Iris Young has described this form of
social relations as the “‘being-together’ of strangers.” 266 Members of a common
community may be strangers in the sense that they come from different cultures,
histories, professions, political regimes, etc. And a community persists without
having either to assimilate or to reject those differences.267 Hence, in the Avon case,
the defendants can claim to be active participants in Chinese culture (primarily via
their membership in the guanxi community), even though they are foreign investors
and have no connection with China other than business operations. It should be
noted, however, that although the defendant corporations can establish a
“membership connection” with the Chinese culture of guanxi, the significance of
such a connection must be evaluated in light of relevant Chinese legal and cultural
policies. The next subsection will show how policy analyses are performed under a
pluralistic conflicts approach.
C. Interest Analysis—Identifying False Conflict
As discussed in the previous subsection, modern conflicts analysis uses
multiple connecting factors to allocate the issues of a case and the parties to
different jurisdictions competing for governance. Traditional conflicts methods,
however, are rather rigid and mechanical. 268 Most of the rules of the first
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, for example, depend exclusively on a single
Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental
Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819, 1859 (2005).
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contact, such as the place of the wrong for torts, or the place of making for contracts,
to determine applicable laws. 269 Traditional conflicts methods have also been
criticized as relying solely on territorial contacts in allocating legislative
jurisdictions, without contemplating the content or underlying polices of the
implicated laws.270 As a result, the traditional choice-of-law methodology has been
compared to a slot machine, which is programmed to pop automatic results once
the coins (the territorial contacts) are inserted.271
In the 1950s and early 1960s, as part of the larger movement away from
formalism toward the legal-realist conception of law as “an instrument of social
control,” Brainerd Currie enunciated a new approach to conflicts analysis:
governmental interest analysis. 272 Currie’s theory of interest analysis marked a
frontal attack against the “conflicts slot machine” and significantly transformed the
discipline of conflict of laws. 273 Governmental interest analysis has as its
fundamental premise that a state may have an interest in applying its law to
multistate disputes in order to effectuate its policies.274 The conflicts technique of
interest analysis consists of two basic steps. First, the court should examine the
substantive policies embodied in the laws of the involved states, primarily through
the ordinary process of statutory “construction and interpretation” 275 commonly
employed in wholly domestic cases. Then, the court shall determine whether each
involved state has an appropriate contact with the parties, the subject matter, or the
litigation, enough that it is reasonable for each state to claim an interest in having
its respective policies effectuated in a specific case. 276 Properly conceived, the
analysis of state interest offers the criteria for classifying conflicts cases into three
categories:
(1) only one of the involved states is interested in applying its law (the
“false conflict” pattern);
(2) more than one state is interested (the “true conflict” pattern); or
(3) none of the states are interested (the “no-interest” pattern or
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“unprovided-for case”).277
Extensive review of Currie’s governmental interest analysis and of his approach
to the disposition of the three conflicts patterns is beyond the scope of this present
study. That review has been conducted elsewhere. 278 Rather, this present study
focuses on an important insight of the interest-analysis theory for resolving cultural
conflicts: conflict can be “minimized” or “avoided” by eliminating false conflicts,
situations where only one state is found to be interested in effectuating its policies
or the policies of several interested states are essentially compatible.279 The idea of
false conflicts greatly simplifies choice-of-law problems by providing a workable
means of identifying the state(s) whose policies are irrelevant to the particular case
presented, eliminating it (or them) from consideration, and ultimately applying the
law of the only interested state.280 In more difficult cases, where initial attempts at
conflict avoidance are unsuccessful and more than one state appears to have an
interest in asserting their policies (a true conflict), Currie further suggested that the
court give a “more moderate and restrained” reassessment of each conflicting policy
to avoid the conflict if possible. 281 That is, an interest analysis aiming at conflict
avoidance “counsels specifically against pushing the interpretation of an apparently
conflicting policy to its constitutional or ultimate possible limit.”282 In contrast, the
conflict-avoidance technique of Currie’s interest analysis requires that the court
construe state interests narrowly, to the extent that what initially appears to be a
true conflict may be transformed into a false one.283
In the Avon case, the potential conflicting laws will likely be identified as the
FCPA and the PRC Criminal Law. At the surface level, an apparent conflict of laws
Symeonides, supra note 14, at 100. In his later work, Currie introduced a fourth category,
what he called an “apparent conflict,” which refers to the situation where “each state would be
constitutionally justified in asserting an interest, but on reflection the conflict is avoided by a
moderate definition of the policy or interest of one state or the other.” See Brainerd Currie, The
Disinterested Third State, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 754, 763 (1963).
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exists between the FCPA and the PRC Criminal Law because the former prescribes
no minimum threshold amount for bribery prosecution while the latter sets a
monetary threshold of RMB30,000 (approximately $4615) for individuals and
RMB200,000 (approximately $30,769) for entities, with only a few exceptions. 284
Despite the apparently conflicting rules, however, an interest-analysis approach
will inquire into the policy goals embodied in both laws, asking whether there is a
true conflict as concerns the effectuation of these polices in this particular case.
Spalding has conducted a detailed analysis of the legislative history and policy
goals of the FCPA.285 He first examined the FCPA’s text and found that “its manifest
purpose is to punish those who supply bribes, and not to punish the recipients or
solicitors, much less their governments or their fellow citizens . . . [t]he statute is
thus ‘supply-side;’ the ‘demand-side’ is well beyond its purview.”286 That is to say,
the FCPA is intended only to target corporations and individuals that have
significant connections to the United States, without any manifest intention to
promote reforms in those countries perceived to have a greater tolerance for
bribery.287 Spalding then examined the FCPA’s legislative history, concluding that
the original motivation of the FCPA lay not in the absence of appropriate moral
standards abroad but rather in the low standards of U.S. corporate behavior. 288
After closely examining the Senate Report,289 the House Report,290 and a series of
testimonies and hearings before Congress,291 Spalding concluded that
China sets a monetary threshold of 30,000 RMB (approximately $4615) for prosecuting
individuals with a few exceptions, such as if the bribe was given to state functionaries in charge
of supervision and administration of food, drugs, production safety and environmental
protection, in which case the monetary threshold for prosecution is 10,000 RMB (approximately
$1538). See The Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in
the Handling of Criminal Bribery Cases (2016), art. 7. The threshold of prosecuting entities for
accepting or offering bribes would be lowered from RMB 200,000 to RMB 100,000, if one of the
following enumerated “aggregative factors” is indicated: (i) gaining unlawful benefits through
bribery; (ii) bribery of more than three persons; (iii) bribery of Party or government leaders,
judicial officers, and administrative enforcement officers; or (iv) causing significant damage to
the state or the people. See The Sup. People’s Proc. Opinions on Prosecution Thresholds of Bribegiving Offences, art. 3.
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an absolute consensus existed on the question of the purpose and intended effects of the
proposed legislation. Bribery is a foreign policy problem because it jeopardizes our
relations with countries whose alliances we very much value. . . . Moreover, all agreed
that these alliances must be maintained through the continued building of economic
and political ties with vulnerable countries, and that the resulting legislation was
therefore designed to promote investment in countries where bribery was occurring,
rather than to withdraw investments as punishment.292

Clearly, the FCPA’s legislators believed that widespread overseas bribery by U.S.
firms had seriously affected the country’s business reputation and, as a result,
impaired U.S. relations with foreign trading partners.293 The primary motivation
behind the FCPA is, therefore, the restoration of image and confidence.294 To be
specific, the FCPA aims to reduce U.S. corporations’ widespread overseas bribery
by “enacting and enforcing comprehensive laws imposing on American
corporations a standard of conduct in their overseas dealings fully as strict as that
required at home.” 295 Moreover, Spalding’s research further uncovers the
consensus among legislators that the FCPA is by no means a tool to curb investment,
but, rather, it aims to build economic and political alliances with host countries
through the promotion of ethical overseas investment.296 To summarize, Spalding’s
study on the legislative purpose of the FCPA comes to two basic conclusions: the
FCPA (a) exclusively targets bribe suppliers having substantial connections to the
United States, without any manifest purpose to punish host-country recipients or
their governments, and (b) aims to promote, rather than deter, investment in those
countries that are perceived to have higher risks of corruption.297 That is to say, the
FCPA’s policy goals will be effectuated only if it is applied in such a way as to protect
America’s business reputation and its political and economic relationship with
foreign business partners.
Under the interest-analysis approach, after determining the FCPA’s policy
goals, the court must then inquire into whether the relationship of the United States
to the Avon case is one that would bring the case within the scope of its policy
concerns, and hence provide a legitimate basis for the claim that the United States
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has an interest in applying the FCPA in this instance. 298 Avon is a multinational
corporation incorporated and headquartered in the United States with a substantial
portion of its business conducted in or through the U.S. market. Avon China,
wholly owned by Avon, is an important overseas presence of America’s cosmetics
industry and as such represents America’s business reputation in the global market.
Any crisis in business ethics involving Avon and its overseas branches, therefore,
would conceivably jeopardize public confidence in America’s business operation.
Moreover, precisely because the United States is the home country of the defendant
corporations, failing to regulate its own corporations’ overseas business conduct in
China would also conceivably jeopardize Sino-American economic relations.
Therefore, the United States has a legitimate interest in applying the FCPA to the
Avon case.
The court must then inquire into the policy concerns that possibly lie behind the
PRC Criminal Law and its inclusion of a monetary threshold for bribery
prosecutions. Bribe giving and bribe taking are integral parts of a corrupt deal. The
high rate of bribe-taking crimes is inseparable from rampant bribe giving activities.
In order to send a clear signal that bribery is not acceptable and to help curb the
request or receipt of bribes, China criminalizes the offering of bribes as a separate
offence.299 Article 393 of the PRC Criminal Law provides that
where an entity offers bribes to state government officials for the purpose of securing
illegitimate benefits . . . , it shall be fined, and the employees of such entity who are
directly in charge of the matter in question and the employees who are directly
responsible for the crime shall be sentenced to up to five years’ imprisonment or
criminal detention, plus monetary penalties.300

Chinese society has significant relationships with the Avon case and may
therefore legitimately assert an interest in applying its law. First, Avon China has
Currie, supra note 279, at 9–10 (“When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather
than the law of the forum, should furnish the rule of decision, the court should first of all
determine the governmental policy—perhaps it is helpful to say the social, economic, or
administrative policy—that is expressed by the law of the forum. The court should then inquire
whether the relationship of the forum state to the case at bar—that is, to the parties, to the
transaction, to the subject matter, to the litigation—is such as to bring the case within the scope
of the state’s governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the assertation that the
state has an interest in the application of its policy in this instance.”).
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its principal place of business in China and committed most of the incriminating
acts within Chinese territory. Avon China, by bribing Chinese government officials,
arguably reinforces local officials’ power to demand bribes and thereby makes
corruption more rampant in China. Second, the Corporate Affairs Group, the
department established by Avon China to engage in guanxi and gift-giving practices,
existed solely in China and was composed primarily of local Chinese employees.
China clearly has an interest in enforcing its laws against its own citizens who
commit a crime within its territory.
The question then turns to whether the setting of a minimum bar for bribery
prosecution means China is uninterested in seeing its anti-corruption laws
enforced on bribes below that bar. To answer this question, it is helpful to first
understand the policy concerns behind the setting up of a threshold for bribery
prosecution. While the threshold for entities remains unchanged, as previously
mentioned, the 2016 Interpretation has raised the minimum bar of prosecuting
individuals from RMB10,000 to RMB30,000 (unless the case has an aggregate factor
specified in Article 7 of the 2016 Interpretation, in which case the threshold is
lowered to RMB 10,000). Subsequent to the promulgation of the 2016
Interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court of China (the “SPC”) issued an official
statement that explained the rationale for setting up a prosecution threshold.301 The
statement reiterated China’s “zero tolerance” policy on corruption, but it also
clarified at the same time that zero tolerance does not necessarily mean zero
threshold for criminal penalties. 302 According to the SPC, the effectiveness of
China’s anti-corruption system depends on the coordination of a varied array of
interrelated structural components, including not only criminal legislation, but also
administrative penalties and political discipline.303 By raising the minimum bar for
criminal prosecutions, necessary space can be reserved for administrative sanctions
and Party disciplines to play their role in fighting corruption.304 The setting up of a
monetary threshold for prosecution not only embodies China’s policy of keeping
Party disciplines at the forefront of anti-corruption campaigns, but also enhances
the certainty, fairness, and seriousness of criminal punishment by highlighting the
301
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focus of criminal crackdown. 305 Stated another way, China’s anti-corruption
system is an organic whole in which criminal prosecutions, administrative
penalties, and Party disciplines complement one another and work together. It is
therefore incorrect to assume that China is uninterested in seeing its anticorruption policies effectuated in the Avon case solely based on the content of
criminal law.
Moreover, even if one is to articulate the governmental interest of China solely
based on an interpretation of its criminal law, the prosecution thresholds should not
be singled out and analyzed in isolation from other relevant provisions concerning
the determination of the amount of bribes—especially those recently added in the
2016 Interpretation. 306 Even though the 2016 Interpretation raises the monetary
thresholds for bribery prosecutions, it nevertheless expands the definition of bribes
to include certain intangible benefits and further clarifies that accepting a thankyou gift offered after improper benefits are sought constitutes bribery. 307
Furthermore, previously, the PRC Criminal Law only prohibited bribes in the form
of “money or property.”308 The 2016 Interpretation clarifies, however, that “money
or property” includes not only cash and in-kind objects but also various “proprietary
interests,” which include material benefits that can be converted into money, such
as home renovation, debt relief, and other benefits that need to be paid using
money, such as membership service, travel, etc. 309 It further clarifies that such
intangible proprietary interests shall be calculated not only on the amount actually
paid, but also on the amount payable, in order to deal with situations in which
services, travel or other intangible benefits may have been intentionally
undervalued by bribe givers. 310 The expansion of the definition of bribes brings
more bribery cases that were previously exempt from criminal liabilities into the
scope of prosecution, which also reflects China’s governmental interest in ramping
up anti-corruption efforts by closing a perceived loophole where some companies
gave intangible benefits as disguised bribes.
Looking beyond criminal statutes and taking into account all relevant antibribery provisions in Chinese law, the Chinese government’s interest in dealing
with the interactive relationship between official and unofficial forms of ordering
with regard to gift giving is clear. Consider, for example, Article 10 of the 2008
305
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Commercial Bribery Opinion which deals specifically with the distinction between
socially and legally acceptable gift-giving practices and illicit bribes.311 By providing
four criteria by which illicit payments may be distinguished from gifts, the Chinese
government acknowledges the prevalence of guanxi and gift-giving practices as
informal rules of conduct in business-to-government realms, where business
investors at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, or even outside the
hierarchy (such as local private entrepreneurs and foreign investors), often have to
rely on the bonds and obligations of personal relationships to make inroads into,
and to benefit from, China’s entrenched bureaucratic power.312
Guanxi can take both positive and troublesome forms as it interacts with the
official laws of China, and it often falls into the gray areas between socially
acceptable and illegal behaviors, especially when it is used by business investors to
get around rules and regulations.313 The business-to-government realm, to borrow
Sally Moore’s thesis, can be considered as a semi-autonomous social field.314 On the
one hand, this social field, in the process of adapting to China’s economic and
political reforms, constantly generates new forms and operating rules of guanxi
internally; 315 on the other hand, the evolution of guanxi practices is vulnerable to
externally imposed state-made legal rules. 316 The Chinese government therefore
feels the need to shape the development path of guanxi and to provide a regulatory
framework for its practice, primarily through specifying in law the circumstances
under which gift giving may have transformed from etiquette to bribery. Besides
Article 10 of the 2008 Commercial Bribery Opinion, the Chinese government has
also implemented a set of Party rules and disciplines to combat power-for-money
deals, which has greatly influenced guanxi practices.317 It is therefore in the interest
of the Chinese government to have its anti-bribery laws enforced and, by declaring
in court decisions what aspects of Avon China’s behaviors are not legally acceptable,
to affect the mode of compliance of guanxi culture to state-made legal rules.
So far, the analysis of the Avon case has presented a true conflict between the
laws of the forum state and China. The FCPA prosecutes the payment of anything of
value without a minimum threshold amount, and it does not attempt to distinguish,
311
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at least not explicitly, between gifts that seemingly take the form of bribes but are
in essence strategies to build personal networks with state functionaries and real
bribes.318 Chinese anti-bribery laws, by contrast, include monetary thresholds for
bribery prosecution and give due consideration to certain guanxi practices that may
be distinguishable from bribery in nature and degree.319 Both states are interested
in applying their laws to this case to effectuate relevant legislative purposes or
policies. The conflict of interests therefore seems to be true and irresolvable.
The uniqueness of interest analysis in conflicts law, however, is that it aims at
conflict avoidance and acts, for the time being and in this particular case, “as if” the
conflict could be narrowed down to a legally resolvable level. Conflicts law achieves
this goal by suggesting that, before making a choice between seemingly conflicting
rules, a “more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the
circumstances in which it must be applied”320 should be given to each conflicting
policy, to make the conflict disappear if possible. 321 For example, Currie’s
governmental interest analysis assumes that China has an interest in applying its
laws only when it would benefit its own domiciliaries.322 Chinese anti-bribery laws,
with higher prosecution thresholds and a more nuanced distinction between
bribery and acceptable gift-giving practices, arguably aim to protect local gift givers
who are deeply influenced by Chinese cultural traditions and engage with Chinese
guanxi networks to the extent permitted by law. In the Avon case, the gift giver is
Avon China, a wholly owned subsidiary of a U.S. corporation incorporated and
headquartered in New York. Avon China entered the Chinese market as an overseas
investor and was therefore not an intrinsic part of Chinese gift-giving culture. As a
result, a more restrained reassessment of the policy goals underlying Chinese antibribery laws would likely suggest that China has relatively little interest in applying
its laws to protect Avon China. Thus, an actual conflict disappears because the
United States turns out to be the only state interested in seeing its laws applied.
It is necessary to point out a key fact that may also exert a material influence on
the outcome of the interest analysis. As previously mentioned, since President Xi
took office in 2013 and launched his unprecedented anti-corruption reforms, the
Chinese government has made it clear that it holds a negative attitude towards gift
exchanges between business actors and state functionaries. China even depicted
foreign MNCs as the prime culprits in commercial bribery and has investigated ever
318
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more deeply into the bribery scandals involving MNCs in recent years.323 The change
in the official attitude of the Chinese government towards business-to-government
gift exchanges, from the often de facto connivance to explicit prohibition, destroyed
any real conflict of interest between China and the United States in the Avon case.
No real conflict of laws exists in this case because policies underlying apparently
conflicting laws are essentially compatible. Imposing criminal liability on Avon
China under the FCPA does not obviously run counter to the anti-corruption
policies of the Chinese government, and therefore the forum law can be applied as
the governing law.
The analysis is likely to show a different result, however, if the Chinese
government tolerates business-to-government gift giving. Let us assume, for
example, that President Xi did not launch the anti-corruption campaign and no
amendments or supplementary interpretations were made to the then-existing
anti-bribery laws after he took office. In such a world, the defendant might be able
to prove to the court that gifts in the forms of nonmonetary or intangible benefits
are tacitly permitted by the Chinese government—either because they are not
explicitly enumerated as prohibited acts by law or because they are not subject to
criminal prosecution in judicial practice. Let us further assume that Avon China can
prove to the court that its gift-giving practices are not in violation of any written
laws of China. In that case, the governmental interest analysis is likely to suggest
that the United States has little interest in enforcing its laws on it: the policy goals
underlying the FCPA are to protect America’s overseas business reputation and
maintain its economic alliances with host countries, and such goals would not be
jeopardized if America’s business conducts are not considered as bribery in foreign
markets.
The court in this instance is therefore likely to find that no conflict of interest
exists and hold that Chinese law should be applied. It is worth noting that this
approach is different from the “local written law defense” prescribed under the
FCPA.324 As previously mentioned in Section II.B.1, the “local written law defense”
defers to foreign cultural norms only if such norms are expressly permitted by
foreign statutes. The interest analysis in conflicts law, in contrast, looks beyond the
literal provisions to consider the deeper-level policy concerns behind state laws. The
interest of a state lies not only in the explicit prohibition or permission of certain
behaviors by law, but also in deliberately excluding certain behaviors from the scope
Yin Pumin, Clamping Down on Corporate Bribery, Beijing Rev. (July 30, 2013),
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2013-07/29/content_557941.htm
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of state regulation and leaving them to be governed by other normative
communities. By identifying a state’s interest in non-interference in certain
spheres of social life, governmental interest analysis offers an opportunity to reveal
the existence of other types of normative orderings that coexist with state law. It
asks why Chinese anti-bribery laws do not prosecute bribes below certain monetary
thresholds and why certain forms of gifts are not considered bribes, and by
answering these questions it sees the complex and interactive relationship between
guanxi and rational-legal regimes in regulating interpersonal relations in China.
In sum, applying the governmental interest analysis to the Avon case is likely to
suggest that the FCPA should be applied as the governing law. The interest analysis
comes to this conclusion in full recognition that China has different legal and
cultural norms in regulating gift giving than the United States. It makes reasonable
attempts to identify the respective policy concerns of the involved states’ laws,
applying the FCPA only after determining that China is uninterested in seeing its
policies effectuated in this case. To be sure, different analysts may approach the
interest analysis in different ways, and there is plenty of room for disagreement on
the conclusion that this current study has reached. To say that China has an interest
in applying its laws only when it would benefit its own citizens and corporations,
but not when it would benefit similarly situated foreign investors, is an “as if”
assertion.325 It is also an “as if” assertion to assume that it is in the interest of China
to have a U.S. law regulate activities exclusively on its territory simply because those
activities happen to be unacceptable to the Chinese government.
Nevertheless, as a legal technique, the interest analysis views problem-solving
as its top priority. To this end, an analyst acts “as if” these assertions hold so that
conflicts may be avoided in this particular case. While these assertions may not hold
true in all cases, they are hard to refute, and conflicts lawyers are self-conscious
about their narrow assumptions of the nature and scope of foreign law: they make
their own assertions about Chinese law, acknowledging at the same time that
Chinese legislators may disagree with their conclusion. This captures a crucial
cultural insight that respect for cultural pluralism does not preclude the U.S. legal
judgments on foreign cultures, but U.S. adjudicators must recognize their own
cultural situatedness before any of these judgments is attempted.326
D. The Public Policy Exception—When and How a Moral Judgment Is Made
Under the conflicts approach, the court does not need to make moral judgments
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about a foreign culture until later in the analysis process. A moral judgment
becomes necessary only when the law of a foreign jurisdiction has been designated
as governing, and the court must decide whether the foreign law offends a strong
public policy of the forum so that its application shall be rejected.327
The previous analyses in this section have suggested that the FCPA is likely to
be the governing law of the Avon case. The court comes to this conclusion not
because it has decided that the rational-legal economic relations in Western
capitalism are morally superior to the ethics of guanxi deeply embedded in China’s
economy, namely the “the ethics of obligation, reciprocity, and mutual aid, and the
responsibilities of friendship and kinship.” 328 But rather, the court makes this
choice because its analyses have suggested that the United States is the only state
interested in seeing its laws applied to these particular defendants, or that the anticorruption policies underlying both U.S. and Chinese laws are essentially
compatible as effectuated in this specific case.
In its previous analyses, the court has examined the content of Chinese law and
culture twice. The first time is when it proves the content of Chinese anti-bribery
rules and the culture of guanxi. The purpose of this step is for the court to answer a
question of “what”—to take notice of the existence of a value system that is foreign
to its own and to know, within the constraining context of a particular set of facts,
what this value system actually is. Then, when conducting the governmental
interest analysis, the court looks at Chinese law and culture for a second time. Part
of the purpose of this second look is to answer a question of “why.” That is, if China’s
legal framework does tolerate, or even encourage, individuals and corporate
entities to employ guanxi networks to obtain business benefits, the court has to
determine why China has such a legal system, primarily through the examination
of the legislative purposes and policy concerns behind relevant anti-bribery rules.
By conducting this examination, the court comes to understand what an
alternative form of market relations looks like and how it conflicts with its own. It
may frame the cultural conflicts behind the Avon case like this: U.S business culture,
which entails “an inflexible bureaucratic or market coldness to the bonds and
obligations of human relations,”329 collides with Chinese business culture, which is
heavily influenced by personalized social networks of power. Regardless of how the
specifics of this conflict may be defined, judges simply lack the political power and
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the requisite resources to weigh conflicting cultural values and decide which one is
morally superior. Under the conflicts approach, however, the court can potentially
resolve this cultural conflict without having to decide which culture is better in
quality. The conflicts approach allows the court to continue its choice-of-law
analysis despite the larger, and perhaps irresolvable, value conflicts behind a
particular case, and it offers non-value-based rationales to justify a decision on the
applicable law, such as the existence of the most significant relationship and a real
governmental interest in the effectuation of relevant policies.
Even in those extraordinary cases in which courts must test the quality of a
foreign culture against the wisdom and fairness of the forum law, the conflicts
approach sets strict limitations on the application of the public policy exception. Let
us assume that the previous analyses have suggested that the culture of guanxi
should be applied to excuse the defendant corporations’ otherwise illegal gift-giving
behaviors. The court must then decide whether this culture is contrary to the public
policy of the United States. The conflicts approach requires that, in order to
override a foreign value system that might otherwise control the result of a
particular case, that foreign culture must violate some “fundamental moral,
ideological, social, economic or cultural standards of the forum.” 330 The public
policy exception must be applied with strict restraint. Therefore, a mere difference
between forum and foreign culture “is not enough to show that public policy forbids
us to enforce the foreign right.”331 In particular, the conflicts approach requires that
the court limit its evaluation of the virtue of a foreign culture within the context of
the particular case in issue. For example, although polygamy in general may
threaten the fundamental conceptions of marital relations at the forum, it might be
acceptable to recognize the validity of a polygamous union as the basis for
inheritance rights.332 By the same token, the court in the Avon case might reject the
application of the culture of guanxi because it is repugnant to some fundamental
business ethics in the U.S. However, this does not mean that duties created via
guanxi-based monetary exchanges may not be enforced by a U.S. court in other
contexts, such as in contractual disputes and debt recovery cases.
In addition, under the conflicts approach, courts usually reject the regulatory
authority of a foreign culture on public policy grounds only when the forum has
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some important connections with the case.333 That is, the incompatibility between
the local and foreign public policies should be evaluated while taking account of the
extent of connection between the case in issue and the forum state. The stronger
the connection is, the more compelling the invocation of a public policy exception
will be. For this reason, it is probably unjustifiable for a U.S. court to replace an
otherwise applicable foreign law with the FCPA when its jurisdiction is based on a
mere tangential connection (i.e., a bank wire transfer or an email) between the
bribery event and the United States.
Moreover, under the conflicts approach, the morality of a foreign culture is
tested only by notions at the forum, not by any values claimed to be universally
recognized.334 That is, even when conflicts lawyers reach the moment in which a
value judgment on a foreign culture must be passed, they consciously limit the scope
of comparison to the normative communities involved in a specific case. Therefore,
a decision to repel the culture of guanxi on public policy grounds only means that
this culture is considered corrupt by the standards of the deciding court’s
community, which is the United States in the Avon case. Whether this culture is
morally objectionable in some objective sense, however, is beyond the consideration
of the court.
CONCLUSION

This Article explores how the discipline of conflict of laws, when imagined and
applied as an intellectual framework, offers new approaches to understanding,
evaluating, and ultimately resolving cultural conflicts in FCPA cases. To this end, I
draw insights from anthropological theories of legal pluralism and adopt a
pluralistic approach to the conflicts analysis. This approach departs from the
traditional conflicts theories and doctrines which only deal with state-made laws,
by assuming that the choice-of-law analysis could be applied to those unofficial
cultural norms that govern significant aspects of people’s lives.
With this in mind, I have applied the pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach to the
analysis of a hypothetical FCPA case. In this case, the Chinese business culture,
which is heavily influenced by personalized social networks of power, allegedly
Symeonides, supra note 14, at 80 (“some codifications bring to the surface the principle that
the ordre public exception should be invoked only when the forum’s connection with the case is
sufficiently close.”); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws,
56 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 981 (1956) (“[t]he overwhelming number of cases which have rejected
foreign law on public policy grounds are cases with which the forum had some important
connection.”).
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collides with the standards of ethical conduct in the United States. I shall clarify
that this Article does not aim to take a position in the conflict between Chinese and
Western business cultures. As has been repeatedly emphasized in the previous
analyses, a conflicts approach to cultural conflicts does not decide which value
trumps in the abstract or in general. Rather, it reframes the larger, and often
irresolvable, cultural clash into a “narrowly tailored and technically specific one,”335
and the result of its analysis only represents normative preferences in the conflict
concerning these particular parties in this specific case at this moment of litigation.
Therefore, in a different FCPA case, the same conflicts approach may very well
suggest that U.S. courts shall subordinate the moral values of the U.S. to those of
China (or to those of any other normative communities competing for jurisdiction).
In sum, a pluralistic conflict-of-laws approach makes two principal
contributions to the resolution of cultural conflicts in FCPA cases. First, from a
descriptive perspective, it offers a framework for understanding and structuring
the interaction between various normative communities involved in cross-border
corruption cases. In identifying conflicting regulatory norms, it goes beyond
official state-made laws and directs the court’s attention to those norms that are
actually viewed as binding and followed by people in international business
practices. It creates habits of mind in decisionmakers where they will be more likely
to consider multiple cultural communities and multiple sources of law in FCPA
cases. Second, from a normative perspective, a pluralistic conflict-of-laws
approach offers a series of doctrines and technical steps to deal with cultural
conflicts in specific cases. It not only provides concrete methods to turn value
conflicts into legally viable outcomes, but also opens up opportunities for decisionmakers to conduct a more nuanced and sophisticated cultural analysis.
Moreover, by focusing on the resolution of transnational cultural conflicts in
state courts, this Article also contributes to the larger conversation about the role of
domestic judicial bodies in global governance agendas. In the Avon case as this
Article has explored it, the U.S. court applied the pluralistic conflict-of-laws
approach to deal with the clash of cultural values between the U.S. and China in gift
giving, business ethics and anti-corruption. The way the court approached this
particular case has implications for global governance. It touches upon issues such
as how to allocate governance authority and how to determine the rights and
obligations of multinational corporations that hold multiple affiliations with
multiple states and with the world as a whole. The analysis performed in this
Article, therefore, also serves as a good example to demonstrate how domestic
courts may be ethically involved in the regulation of transnational business
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activities and broader international anti-bribery efforts.
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